

numerous grassroots groups moved the reconciliatory process after WWII; and since 1989, the dialogue of recognition across borders has engaged academics, students, workers and journalists as well as politicians and bureaucrats. Provided with enough evidence, more EU citizens might identify with the innovative political practices of the European foundations. I am well aware that much work remains to be done to delineate the principles of action at the heart of the European project, and that other interpretations are quite possible. For Arendt, understanding is “unending and therefore cannot produce final results.” But this did not stop her quest, nor should it stop ours.<sup>88</sup>

*Gyisae, A Political Theory  
of Identity in European Integration,  
Routledge, 2012*

## 2 “After the deluge”

### The principle of reconciliation

#### Introduction

European integration is accepted today as a successful project for peace, and respondents to the Eurobarometers put a high priority on peace as a European value.<sup>1</sup> But only recently has reconciliation become a rhetorical leitmotiv to legitimize this project. For almost four decades, the consensus among decision-makers was that Europe would be built on tangible foundations such as the productivity index, trade and investment. Brief references to peace, prosperity and democracy in treaty preambles signaled larger ambitions, but there were few public debates.<sup>2</sup> The 1993 Copenhagen criteria for EU accession, which clarified EU values officially, left peace and reconciliation unmentioned.<sup>3</sup> The starting date of the reconciliatory process is not readily agreed upon, and the accession of 12 Member States in 2004 and 2007 with different historical experiences makes the task of definition even more challenging.<sup>4</sup> Peace, once achieved, is “quiet,” which may explain why the development of an EU peace community entailing reconciliation between former enemies has been under-analyzed.<sup>5</sup> But undetermined concepts quickly morph into empty clichés that excite cynicism rather than involvement.<sup>6</sup> To understand when, and how, the European reconciliation process started therefore matters politically.

This chapter offers an interpretative analysis of the speech and deeds of the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)’s founders and of civil society actors in post-WWII Western Europe. It draws its main conceptual framework from Arendt’s discussions of action, forgiveness and promise, and Jaspers’ reflections on political accountability; but the analysis borrows also from comparative politics and conflict resolution theory to explain the material aspect of the ECSC reconciliatory politics and the role of the US. Indeed, the ECSC’s founding and the attendant grassroots initiatives constitute highly complex and overlapping processes that a singular theory cannot interpret adequately; interpretative analyses that pay attention to lived experiences are rarely parsimonious. The Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC came out of a complex web of relationships, in which five practices – breaking with the culture of blame and accounting for the past, forgiving, promising, a fair reorganization of the economic relations between the parties and the benevolent involvement of an external political power – together weaved

the new. Jacques Attali dubs the ECSC founding as “easy.”<sup>7</sup> I argue that, on the contrary, the start of European integration may hold useful lessons for the present because it was fraught with difficulties and fragile. This chapter’s Part I examines the theoretical understandings of peace and reconciliation developed by EU scholars, and explains what political theory can add to comparativist studies to develop an interpretative framework of the post-WWII reconciliation processes in Western Europe. It examines the founding of the ECSC as an example of state policy-making for reconciliation. However, if political reconciliation cannot occur without state action, it implies also psychological processes of conversion in individuals who move from enmity to partnership. Part II analyzes the processes of self-transformation in elite and grassroots actors, drawing from their speech and deed. Part III offers some EU leaders’ reflections on the political relevance of the post-WWII reconciliatory experiences for current conflicts. Chapter 3 will discuss two other applications: the first focuses on the search for solutions to conflicts in the Western Balkans, and the second on the attempts to create an EU “memory,” a highly diversified and agonistic exercise.

## Part I Theories and state practices of peace-making

### *Comparative analyses of EU reconciliation*

In conflict resolution literature, peace is usually defined as the elimination of war as a means for solving international conflicts, through changes in structural/institutional conditions and learning processes; whereas reconciliation refers to an affective and psychological process involving the healing of emotions and the elimination of resentment.<sup>8</sup> The brief 1950 Schuman Declaration, which made public the French offer to Germany to create jointly with other European countries a European Coal and Steel Community, mentions the words peace and peaceful five times, but not reconciliation. Lily Gardner Feldman, however, like many other Europeanists, uses the two terms almost interchangeably while establishing another useful distinction between “pragmatic” reconciliatory policies that serve state interests and security and the “moral” programs that break age-old animosities.<sup>9</sup> If peace is an unattainable “absolute,”<sup>10</sup> reconciliation need not mean the final elimination of conflicts. Rather, conflicts are now “articulated as differences that can be managed rather than existential threats;” they become “productive contention in a shared and cooperative framework.”<sup>11</sup> At the state level, the plan for a European Coal and Steel Community proposed structural changes: *de facto* economic solidarity and supranational institutions rather than the healing of emotions and amity. Meanwhile, grassroots movements sought the healing of memories and promoted reconciliation, manifesting a “spontaneous reconciliatory tendency,” which has been observed at other important junctures of the European integration process.<sup>12</sup>

Theorizing 60 years of reconciliatory efforts across the European continent is an ambitious task that few have tackled. Neo-functionalism offered an original explanation of the rapprochement among the first six Member States that combined the pursuit of material interests with changes in mindsets,<sup>13</sup> but perhaps because of the

*eurosclerosis* of the 1960s and 1970s scholars lost interest. The difficult ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty prompted new inquiries into the relationship between political ethics and legitimacy,<sup>14</sup> although the reconciliatory dimension of European integration continued to attract little scholarly attention, with a few exceptions.<sup>15</sup> This need not surprise as the EC was for three decades “rather conservative about its potential role in conflict resolution, preferring to ignore disputes among Member States.” The 1999 Helsinki European Council, however, established the peaceful resolution of outstanding border disputes as a Community principle for its current and future Member States, and today the EU identifies peace-making as a key priority of its external action.<sup>16</sup> Scholars have responded. Current assessments of the outcomes of the EU’s reconciliatory policies are mixed: neither in Cyprus, nor in the Israeli–Palestine case have conflicts become de-securitized, although this has not altered EU self-perceptions as a “force for good.”<sup>17</sup> At the same time, there is evidence that the prospect of EU membership has encouraged rapprochements between Germany and Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic/Slovakia, Greece and Turkey, and in the Western Balkans.<sup>18</sup> The EU has used its contractual relationships with neighboring countries to mediate solutions to some conflicts successfully, for instance between Serbia and Montenegro. In the case of Ireland it intervened both directly in the peace process by funding cross-community projects, and indirectly by affecting the broader political context.<sup>19</sup> Although there is frequent mention of the French–German reconciliation as a precedent and inspiration,<sup>20</sup> this is not a literature about memory or a political tradition. It exhibits little familiarity with the lived experience of French and German actors of reconciliation, and no indication of what past experiences might transmit beyond a sense of possibility (admittedly important). This lack of interest in analyzing founding practices may strike one as odd given the already long history of European integration. Could this be one reason why “EU pacifism provided scant guidance in how to deal . . . with ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the religious fanaticism of the Near East”?<sup>21</sup>

Arendt might not have been surprised by such lacunae in “understanding.” She took pains to distinguish the “reconciliation” with one’s fate, which understanding permits, from the peace-making practices of forgiveness and promise.<sup>22</sup> As a self-described “phenomenologist,” she adopted story-telling as the point of departure for her concept of political thinking.<sup>23</sup> Story-telling need not establish causal relationships but be plausible.<sup>24</sup> This chapter offers a political theorist’s interpretation of European integration as a set of *internal* experiments in peace-making through stories that make sense, therefore completing the increasingly sophisticated comparative analyses of the EU as an *external agent* for peace in conflictual situations.<sup>25</sup> Because context matters to understanding, the next section describes the political and socio-economic setting, in which some Western European actors started anew in 1950.<sup>26</sup>

### *The setting*

Milward documents “the speed and success of western Europe’s economic recovery,” beginning in 1947 even before the Marshall Plan was in place.<sup>27</sup> At the

time, however, no one in Europe could anticipate these developments. The British government for the first time had to ration bread and tea, a measure kept in place until 1951. In France and Italy, strong communist parties challenged parliamentary systems. In West Germany entire cities had been razed, and over 12 million displaced ethnic Germans had to be integrated into a nonfunctioning economy.<sup>28</sup> Even if cities could be rebuilt, lost lives and loves could not be retrieved. In these conditions, how could peoples ever trust one another enough to act in concert again? Barrington Moore, Jr. argues that, "It is just plain hate that holds people together. More specifically, shared hatreds play a crucial role in social bonding all the way from small groups of friends up to membership in big states and even empires." Hate also holds international communities together: see the rapprochement between France and Britain directed against Germany in the early twentieth century. "Hostility as such does not disappear. There is merely a change of target." There is no doubt that the Stalinist threat in the Eastern part of Europe and the American presence in the West spurred Western Europeans to action. Moore's "ways" to peace, "new threat," "mutual exhaustion," and the "competing attractions" of economic growth were at work.<sup>29</sup> However, to think that these factors would have been enough to bring about the French-German reconciliation, on which the whole European integration process was predicated, is to overlook the depth of feelings separating the two countries and their neighbors after centuries of war.<sup>30</sup>

In 1945 the Western Allies pondered what to do with Germany. They soon abandoned the harsh Morgenthau Plan for the de-industrialization of the country because, at the onset of the Cold War, West Germany needed to be solidly integrated into the Western alliance and to play its part in the economic redevelopment of Europe. With the Marshall Plan the Americans hoped to foster not only European reconstruction, but also integration. But in the late 1940s France was not ready for this step. General De Gaulle, and after him George Bidault, imitated the policies of 1919, by annexing the Saar economically, while granting it political autonomy, and making sure that the Rhineland would remain a buffer zone between France and the potential German aggressor.<sup>31</sup> They refused to merge their occupation zone with the Anglo-American Bizone, although they relented a year later; and they failed to impose on the Ruhr the strict allied control they sought. In 1949 the newly elected government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) obtained considerable autonomy in managing the coal and steel industries, where production had reached its prewar level.<sup>32</sup> As the FRG sought an end to the International Ruhr Authority imposed by the occupying forces, its industrial plants were still being dismantled and transported to France as war reparations, and the status of the Saar was another important point of contention. The French also opposed the higher rate of devaluation for the mark that the Germans were seeking. In 1950 Winston Churchill and the Council of Europe recommended the creation of a European army, which would include a German contingent. The French government, who had most of its troops stationed in Indochina, adamantly opposed this proposal.

***"Despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge:"  
Jaspers and the question of German guilt***

Arendt and Jaspers, victims and survivors of Nazism, gave much thought to the reconstruction of the public realm "despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge."<sup>33</sup> Jaspers' discussion of personal and collective guilt sheds light on one key practice of the ECSC principle of reconciliation: accounting for the past. Historically, the rulers of a new political order have not been held accountable for the corruption of the previous order. And, until the 1960s, there were few popular debates about guilt and responsibility for the crimes perpetrated during WWII in any of the countries involved. What matters here is that some chose to assume responsibility on both the victims and perpetrators' side (and in the latter case to offer sizable compensations).

On the victims' side, already in 1941, a few months after France had been invaded, French philosopher Jacques Maritain stated boldly during a lecture tour to the US that, "no doubt the Versailles Treaty and even more the faults which followed it have contributed to the rise of Hitler." He called for a federal Europe in which a confederal Germany would be integrated. "We are all really much too unhappy not to convert ourselves."<sup>34</sup> Prisoners in Nazi and fascist camps elaborated projects for the future "United States of Europe." Such were Léon Blum in Buchenwald, Simone Weil in Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen, Jean Rey in several German prisoner camps, and Altiero Spinelli on the island of Ventotene, to mention only a few of the most illustrious personalities; and eight resistance movements issued a public call in 1944 from Geneva for the reintegration of a democratic Germany in a "united and pacified" Europe.<sup>35</sup> At the state level, both the Schuman Declaration and the Preamble of the ECSC Treaty signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries included frank admissions of Europe's "age-old rivalries" and "sanguinary divisions," but without finger-pointing: "a united Europe was not achieved and we had war."<sup>36</sup> French Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman did not minimize the difficulty of the relationship with Germany after WWII, "which will remain perpetually dissatisfied, history has proved it." But he acknowledged France's own dynastic and ideological ambitions, manifested especially in Napoleon's invasions; so that both countries must overcome "painful memories" to move "from hate to esteem and mutual trust" and deal with each other on a basis of equality.<sup>37</sup> When Maritain and Schuman recognized publicly the historical wounds that their country inflicted upon Germany, few of their fellow citizens endorsed these views.<sup>38</sup> Assuming some responsibility for the conflict need not negate German guilt and responsibility for WWII, but it made it psychologically and politically feasible to include the perpetrator on an equal footing in 1950.

Recent research suggests that "public memory of Nazi atrocities was inaugurated in West Germany, not in the 1960s as historians have suggested, but in the 1940s and 1950s."<sup>39</sup> During the winter of 1945-6 Jaspers asked his Heidelberg University students, many of them war veterans, to reflect on *The Question of German Guilt*. Jaspers addressed himself to every citizen, not just a few grievous perpetrators, and in that respect he offers a very different perspective from the current

scholarly debates on transitional justice.<sup>40</sup> He associated himself with German guilt in spite of the persecutions he and his Jewish wife had suffered under Nazi rule (and he did not exempt the Allies either from responsibilities):<sup>41</sup> "Being thus spared, yet, in view of our own survival, having a sense of shared guilt, we felt increasingly challenged to live right and to work to the very limits of our capacity."<sup>42</sup> He argued that the capacity for political freedom hinges on the willingness to assume guilt: in that case, "no one is beyond the pale of human existence."<sup>43</sup> Jaspers' four-fold typology of guilt – criminal, political, moral and metaphysical – develops a sophisticated argument about the intricacies of collective and individual guilt and reconnects with the Socratic insight that to be at home in the world is to be at home with oneself. Criminal guilt applies to the few who have committed acts capable of objective proof, and it concerns the individual. The Nuremberg trials, in spite of their shortcomings, were the harbinger of a future world order to which victors and vanquished should submit. In contrast, political guilt involves both leaders and citizens of a state that had wronged others. Jaspers wanted the German people to amend by paying reparations even at the cost of continuing poverty. But if Germans were "collectively liable" for actions committed in their name, they were not in the "moral sense of actual and intellectual participation in the crime." Like criminal guilt, moral and metaphysical guilt can only be acknowledged by the individual through a work of "penance" and "repentance."<sup>44</sup> Jaspers was well aware that few would undertake this task; nevertheless he encouraged Germans to engage in a process of individual "purification," thus leaving resolutely the realm of politics, which has to do with public action not individual conversion.<sup>45</sup> He was so adamant about the need for purification that he counseled American officials to retain political control of Germany for 20 years until "the power of reasonable men – who exist in Germany, and I believe, in good measure – has matured;" this practical learning process could only start in "communities," at the local level.<sup>46</sup> Disappointed by the Allies' negative response and the lack of introspective thought among Germans, Jaspers moved to Switzerland with his wife Gertrud in 1948, became a Swiss citizen and lectured at Basel University until his death.<sup>47</sup>

Politicians, not political theorists, implement the difficult politics of atonement. On this score, the FRG's first Chancellor's record is "complicated."<sup>48</sup> Konrad Adenauer, who was arrested several times during the war and lost his second wife to the sequels of internment in a Gestapo camp, supported premature amnesty and public forgetting for those who had not been active supporters of Nazism. He worked hard and long, however, on tangible restitution to the Holocaust's victims, and on establishing a stable democracy in the FRG.<sup>49</sup> At considerable political risk he started negotiations in 1951 with the state of Israel and Jewish organizations to repair for the "eternal suffering" the German nation had inflicted upon the Jewish people. The FRG's economic situation was difficult, with 12 million refugees from the East to resettle and the repayment of loans to the Allies. But, "the demands of the State of Israel and of the world Jewish associations were first of all justified morally. They should be examined in this spirit."<sup>50</sup>

In his *Memoirs* Adenauer adopts a Jaspers-like self-reflective and critical tone to prod his fellow citizens to accountability:

If we were to emerge from this misery and to find the right way forward, we had first to understand what had brought us so low. We could find the way to a better future only if we recognized how we had got into this most fatal period in the history of the German people. To find our course we had to search our consciences.<sup>51</sup>

The "seminal causes" reached back well before 1933, although National Socialism was "the immediate cause of the catastrophe." Nazism could not have come to power "had it not found fertile soil for its poisonous seed among much of the population." For many decades the German people suffered from the wrong attitude to the state. Not only military and business elites, but also farmers, shopkeepers, professionals, intellectuals and workers had worshiped the state and subordinated the individual's worth to it.<sup>52</sup> If the criminal policies of Nazism were a national responsibility, were Jaspers and Adenauer "essentializing" certain German attitudes and thus trapping their fellow citizens in a set of negative stereotypes? This cannot be said of Jaspers: he argued that if Germans accepted the challenge of communicating with one another they could forge a new sense of collective identity; and Adenauer pointed to the long tradition of city self-rule in Germany. Yet both asserted daringly the responsibility of the citizens for their state's policies even under totalitarian conditions.

Beginning something new is dangerous business. The negotiations between Israel and the FRG were so controversial in both countries that they took place in the Netherlands, and an assassination attempt was made on Adenauer in March 1952. After the agreement was successfully concluded in September of that year for a DM 3 billion payment, Adenauer expressed his satisfaction "to have contributed however little to erase the evil committed," although the agreement "was only a symbol . . . a modest tentative to rehabilitate Germany." When he visited Israel in 1966 as an official guest and met many German-born Israelis, he "hardly felt in them hate or enmity; they showed moving greatness" in spite of "the monstrosities which burden our past."<sup>53</sup> It is estimated that between 1952 and 2000 the FRG paid some \$70 billion to the state of Israel and other war victims. Negotiations of compensations between Israel, Jewish organizations and Germany have continued for 60 years.<sup>54</sup>

### *Forgiving and promising in the ECSC founding*

Jaspers' call for self-reflection cannot by itself help a people develop a new sense of identity: too much introspection leads to denial, despair and despondency.<sup>55</sup> Even thoughtful actors commit acts whose consequences are unpredictable and irreversible; this is why Arendt makes the concepts of promise and forgiveness central to her theory of public action.<sup>56</sup> Forgiving palliates the irreversibility of action; it is the only "reaction," which "does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven." As for the faculty of promising, it creates "islands of certainty" and remedies

action's unpredictability. Promises are almost always written: laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances.<sup>57</sup> Forgiving and promising should be understood as "potentialities" arising directly from the human capacity for action, not private affects or spiritual insights. They imply a political relationship.<sup>58</sup> Promise has long been accepted in political theory and practice. But Arendt is well aware that she breaks with an old tradition by *politicizing* forgiveness.

One reason why forgiveness is so controversial in politics is that it may contradict the requirements of justice, on which the legitimacy of democratic orders rests. Thus Ricoeur concedes a political role to promise, but does not see how forgiveness could be institutionalized: state amnesties granted for utilitarian and therapeutic reasons are a poor substitute.<sup>59</sup> Thomas Brudholm objects to processes of forgiveness and reconciliation, which too often discount the victims' voice and feelings. And George Kateb critiques political forgiveness for its all inclusive vagueness: "no one is entitled to forgive me for the wrong I have done except the person to whom I have done wrong."<sup>60</sup> It is important to note, however, that Arendt is not discussing institutions of forgiveness such as amnesty, but forgiving as the breaking free from the vicious cycle of revenge and as a political experience.<sup>61</sup> Forgiveness does not count as the opposite of punishment: only punishable acts can be forgiven and the radical evil manifested in Nazism is beyond the scope of forgiveness.<sup>62</sup> And one may ask Kateb: what about collective harm inflicted by one collectivity upon another? It is precisely because of the "intractability of injustice even in the best regimes that we should consider the appropriateness of forgiving."<sup>63</sup>

Arendt deserves credit for freeing the concept of forgiveness from its Christian ghetto, a secularizing but not anti-religious move, which Ricoeur resists by coupling forgiveness with repentance, a process of self-reflection unbinding the agent from his act.<sup>64</sup> Arendt is loath to enter the secret recesses of the human heart and thus repentance does not feature in her considerations. Political forgiveness is to act anew, unshackled by the past, but hardly forgetfully; it "resists the power of the past to determine the possibilities of the present."<sup>65</sup> At times Arendt proves to be a "frustrating theorist in that her originality and insights are not developed in concrete examples."<sup>66</sup> Young-Bruehl argues, however, that Arendt's political theory can be applied to many contemporary political practices including the European Union, an "astonishing demonstration of the power of promising" and a "miraculous transformation."<sup>67</sup>

Surprisingly there is a dearth of commentaries on the tight connection between forgiving and promising in the vast scholarly literature on Arendt, but the story of the ECSC founding illustrates to what extent promise and forgiveness "belong together."<sup>68</sup> When Jean Monnet, a senior French civil servant,<sup>69</sup> approached the French Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schuman with his proposal for the European Coal and Steel Community in April 1950, Germany had requested the authorization to increase its steel production from 11 to 14 million metric tons while French production was leveling off. The Anglo-Saxons were favorable to a German economic renaissance but the French felt threatened. François Duchêne, Monnet's close collaborator, explains why the Schuman Declaration on the ECSC,

which proposed to place under shared political control two industries crucial to the war effort, came as a shock to the Western Allies: it would make war materially impossible. It was the willingness of the French to submit to a common authority with the Germans within an egalitarian organization open to the participation of all the other European nations that convinced the Dutch to sign the treaty.<sup>70</sup> US ambassador to France David Bruce described the Schuman Plan in a cable to US State Secretary Dean Acheson as "the most imaginative and far-reaching approach" that has been made for generations to the settlement of fundamental differences between France and Germany.<sup>71</sup>

Ideally political theorists should let political reality challenge, and if necessary, change their ideas. This is a difficult act, and Arendt did not see that the capacity to act together of formerly bitter enemies – France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries – could illustrate her theorizing of political forgiveness as the human capacity for new beginnings. Her view of politics literally hinges on natality, and she writes of this life-changing ability with awe: "the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle." Even *The Origins of Totalitarianism* does not conclude on a despondent note: "But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning. . . . This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man."<sup>72</sup> In the case of European integration Schuman was "every man." He assumed the political risks of the initiative for the ECSC and on 9 May 1950 chose to announce the plan directly to the public because "it was essential to act quickly and to impact public opinion before any diplomatic negotiation, thus pushing the governments toward an agreement."<sup>73</sup> According to Schuman, "the surprise was general. Nobody expected an initiative of this kind."<sup>74</sup> If political forgiveness is about giving up revenge and daring to propose an action in concert with former enemies, as Arendt and Digeser both argue, then the French proposal for the ECSC can be interpreted as emblematic of this human capacity.

The Schuman Declaration also offered a promise, which the Treaty of Paris institutionalized.<sup>75</sup> Scholars and actors have compared the American and the European founding experiences.<sup>76</sup> Like their American predecessors, the Europeans trusted constitutional arrangements more than individual good will.<sup>77</sup> When Jean Monnet left the presidency of the ECSC High Authority, his collaborators gave him a bound volume of his speeches, *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe ont commencé*, whose title "reflects well the spirit of the time."<sup>78</sup> The Schuman Declaration can be compared to the American Declaration of Independence in so far as it set forth basic goals and principles. The Treaty of Paris' Preamble retained its lofty language.<sup>79</sup> But the 180 pages of this European promise, with its 100 articles divided into ten chapters, three annexes, two protocols, and one exchange of letters between the governments of France and Germany regarding the status of the Saar, and a Convention on the transitional provisions, does not make for politically inspiring reading in spite of Monnet's assertion that "it was beautifully written, in a strict and limpid style."<sup>80</sup> Article 2 defines the tasks of the community: "to contribute . . . to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living of the Member States." The other articles deal with the implementation of free competition, the establishment of a common market for coal and

steel, fair prices, and the modernization of production. The Community executive, or High Authority (HA), carries technocratic and economic responsibilities: to grant loans to encourage investment programs, promote technical and economic research related to production, assist redundant workers, and authorize industrial agreements and concentration.<sup>81</sup>

The goal of the ECSC was "a partial fusion of sovereignty" to eliminate domination by the strongest, and its alternative, lawlessness.<sup>82</sup> The HA, in making executive decisions on matters pertaining to coal and steel, would act by majority, which meant that individual Member States' wishes could be ignored in the name of the common European interest. The Benelux countries, which worried about Franco-German domination, insisted on a coordinating Council of Ministers in addition to the supranational HA.<sup>83</sup> The Member States would refer disputes to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which had general competence to interpret the treaty.<sup>84</sup> There was no treaty provision establishing that Community law overrode national law, but the ECJ established this principle in spite of the resistance of several Member States, and the Court became central to the integration process by insuring that the law was applied uniformly throughout the Community.<sup>85</sup>

Consistent with her critical stand on the post-WWII order in Europe, Arendt noted "the extraordinary instability and lack of authority of most European governments restored after the downfall of Hitler's Europe."<sup>86</sup> Yet governments proved determined enough to found a new covenant and to lay down rules to allow future integration in their national constitutions. The 1949 German Basic Law and the French, Dutch, Luxembourg, Italian and Danish constitutions all made provision for the partial transfer of sovereignty to international institutions for the sake of peace.<sup>87</sup> In political practice new beginnings do not mix easily with stability.<sup>88</sup> The idea of process was so important to Monnet that he refused Luxembourg's offer to construct permanent office buildings for the ECSC, only to regret it later.<sup>89</sup> Schuman ended *Pour L'Europe* with a question: "Will Europe ever be completed? No one can say." It was "a partial success . . . the starting point for more ambitious realizations."<sup>90</sup> But enough promises were made and kept to mitigate the paralyzing impact of action's unpredictable consequences.

In spite of her mistrust of the role of goodness in politics, Arendt, like Jaspers, theorized poignantly the ethical stands that guarantee the rebirth and continuation of politics. But neither paid much attention to the material conditions that guarantee the very survival of the actors and constitute the core of state policies.<sup>91</sup> Comparativists have more to say on the role of economic interests in reconciliatory politics, which the next section discusses.

### *Reorganizing material relations towards fairness*

Lily Gardner Feldman stresses the pragmatic aspect of successful reconciliatory politics, programs of economic cooperation, which serve state interests and constitute a "proven source of security and prosperity."<sup>92</sup> In contrast with Jaspers and Arendt, the European founders did not establish a strong distinction between economics and politics: economic interactions would create the public space where

former enemies could learn to trust and begin to act together again.<sup>93</sup> Max Kohnstamm, who became a close collaborator of Monnet in 1950, was held captive by the Germans for two years. He explains the "rational" aspect of reconciliation:

At first, there was a very strong feeling of hate among the prisoners. But it did not last very long. No genius was required to understand that we could not rebuild Europe without the Germans. The Netherlands, a de facto economic province of Germany, needed German industry. But what was the meaning of German renaissance if bombs were again fabricated in the Ruhr and dropped on Rotterdam? How to break out of this vicious circle?<sup>94</sup>

Kohnstamm's first trip to Germany was an "eye-opener." Rotterdam had always been the port of the Ruhr. But in their eagerness to get the German economy going again the Anglo-American occupiers had all exports from the Ruhr go through the port of Hamburg, thus recreating Hitler's autarchic system. When Kohnstamm complained, the Allies agreed with him, but responded that they were responsible for Germany only. This is why when he read in the London *Times* the Schuman Declaration, Kohnstamm felt "struck as if by thunder . . . This was the answer to the vicious circle which was not only economic, but also moral and ethical."<sup>95</sup>

Assessments of the economic benefits of the ECSC vary greatly.<sup>96</sup> Some call it a success because production and trade in coal and steel increased considerably among the six partners, by 21 per cent in coal, by over 25 per cent in iron ore and by 157 per cent in steel;<sup>97</sup> others a failure, in spite of the elimination of tariffs and quotas.<sup>98</sup> The German steel cartels were never successfully dismantled, partly because Monnet did not want to antagonize the FRG government during the difficult negotiations over the European Defense Community. As a result, by 1957 eight firms controlled the entire German steel production.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, the HA also had occasional difficulties with the other ECSC institutions and national governments who had no intention of giving it *carte blanche*; therefore it failed to acquire the political status which Monnet had hoped for. In 1959 the ECSC was unable to solve a serious coal crisis, and it became apparent that partial integration, which did not cover competing energy sources such as oil and nuclear power, could not guarantee European prosperity.<sup>100</sup> After the launching of the EEC and Euratom in 1958, competition developed between the different Communities and, in 1967, the ECSC High Authority merged with the EEC Commission.

From the start, however, the ECSC was able to develop generous programs of subsidized housing for miners and retraining for unemployed workers, thanks to its levies on production and to US and Swiss loans; it gathered crucial information about the European energy markets which had not been available in a structured form before and developed a rich experience in the areas of investment, competition and economic forecasting and planning; and it developed community-wide tax policies. It also fostered unprecedented relationships of collegiality among representatives of six nation-states that would carry over in the establishment of the EEC a few years later.<sup>101</sup>



***The US: benevolent hegemon, mediator or "actor in concert?"***

How to interpret the role that the US played in the ECSC founding? Conflict resolution literature has paid much attention to mediation and the role of the international community in peace-making since 1989.<sup>102</sup> Lily Gardner Feldman's comparative study of the Federal Republic of Germany's relationships with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic after WWII, lists the intervention of third parties as one of the four "variables" affecting reconciliatory processes in the international context.<sup>103</sup> It is difficult to theorize the US presence in Western Europe in the late 1940s according to the usual IR norms of realism, liberalism or constructivism. It could be said that the US was a kind of mediator. Or another way to interpret its role is that the US used its hegemonic position (or dominance) benevolently to help open and protect public spaces in Western Europe for the four reconciliatory practices detected so far: accounting for the past, forgiving, promising, and a fair rearrangement of economic relations between former enemies.<sup>104</sup>

The US called the worst breaker of peace to account by organizing the Nuremberg trials, which left the Allies off the hook in terms of their own crimes or questionable acts during the war. But victors' justice was better than no justice. The US also encouraged the democratization of the West German occupied zones and provided legal assistance to the drafters of the 1949 Basic Law; it made sure that the Marshall Plan funds would encourage European cooperation by requiring that the 16 state beneficiaries draft the plan for distribution of the funds together in the newly created Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).<sup>105</sup> Most importantly perhaps, the US decided to defer to the French instead of pushing for the immediate re-armament of the FRG. Shortly after the election of the first German government in 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked his French colleague Schuman "to define the main lines of the common policies which we should adopt toward Germany." Bernard Clappier, Schuman's *directeur de cabinet*, remembers that Schuman would ask him every week afterward: "And Germany? What should I do to fulfill the mandate which has been entrusted to me?" It had become for him an obsession.<sup>106</sup> The US government waited eight months without any guarantee of the outcome, and subsequently it supported the Schuman proposal for the ECSC, which it had no part in developing, against British opposition. A young Harvard professor, Robert Bowie, drafted the two most controversial articles on anti-trust legislation in the Treaty at Monnet's request;<sup>107</sup> and as soon as the ECSC started its operation in Luxembourg, the US appointed a Special Representative.

Gratitude toward the United States was sincere, but hardly naive. Monnet wrote, "I feel easier in my mind when Europeans take the necessary steps to establish equality between themselves and the United States." Yet he remarked in a 1953 speech to the ECSC Assembly that for "the first time in history . . . a great power, instead of founding its policies on maintaining divisions, grants its resolute and continuous support to the creation of a large Community founded on the union of previously separated people." He was referring to the continuous US moral and political support to the ECSC and a recent US loan to the Community of \$100 million at the advantageous rate of 3.7 per cent.<sup>108</sup> Rather

than as a hegemon, or mediator, more often than not the US acted in concert with its Western European allies.

The ECSC's manifold political impact qualifies it as the first major European state-led initiative for reconciliation after WWII, although it has faded from memory today. It "delivered" on its most important promise, the European integration process and "substituted for a peace treaty with Germany."<sup>109</sup> Moreover, the High Authority, in which Member States had equal status, replaced the International Ruhr Authority under which the Germans had chafed. The French annexation of the Saar territory ended peacefully with a 1955 referendum when the Saar population chose to join the FRG. Finally, the US request for German re-armament was satisfied through German accession to NATO in 1955, which had become acceptable to France in the new climate of trust.

**Part II Self-transformation*****Elite testimonies***

Grassroots movements rather than elite leadership provided the necessary emotional underpinning to the European reconciliation. But too sharply drawn distinctions between elite and popular behavior distort the facts.<sup>110</sup> Pro-integration leaders were well aware of the political importance of emotions although they conceived the new transeuropean institutions as an instrument of behavioral transformation rather than healing of emotions. They stressed the "psychological" barriers between the nations of Europe: "Men's attitudes must be changed:" the French had to be delivered of their fears of the Germans, the Germans of the humiliation of occupation, according to Monnet.<sup>111</sup> For Adenauer, the ECSC would change "the thinking and political feeling of European man."<sup>112</sup>

Openly facing and overcoming a legacy of abuse can induce feelings of shame, which explains perhaps also why there are relatively few elite testimonies on such transformative processes. Jacques-René Rabier and Max Kohnstamm, who started working with Jean Monnet early in their careers, warn against an "excessive idealization" of European integration.<sup>113</sup> But Kohnstamm still recalls with emotion meeting the author of the Schuman Declaration in 1950:

It was love at first sight. I was struck by Monnet's worldwide vision, which was political, not economic. He was proposing a deep change in the relationships between nations with a very soft voice; it was about introducing a new element in these relationships besides national sovereignty. Monnet did not write on his philosophy, but all his actions were guided by a philosophical conception: what matters is man as a person, not abstractions. 'He is abstract, thus cruel,' wrote Dostoevsky. De Gaulle talked about French greatness as an abstraction. Monnet was a personalist even if he did not pronounce this word. He detested domination and relationships of inequality; the rule of law was essential, because men stand equal under it.<sup>114</sup>

Both Kohnstamm and Rabier reject the idea that the ECSC should be understood as a symbol of forgiveness and stress promise instead, i.e. the bedrock of institutionalized and mutual commitments. Working with the Germans was not a problem. "What mattered above all was the future. We were called to the same task, and quickly a climate of trust developed among us."<sup>115</sup> Kohnstamm, who was held in a German concentration camp because of his student resistance activities during WWII, prefers to speak of European reconciliation rather than forgiveness. Like Kateb, he thinks:

Forgiveness is a personal act. To speak of forgiving the Germans in general is already the beginning of the Holocaust, a dangerous abstraction. Moreover, to find the guilty ones is a complex task. It is absurd to speak only of the German sin; Europe was guilty. Few countries can be entirely proud of their attitude during that period. Keynes had warned us that the Treaty of Versailles might provoke another war.<sup>116</sup>

Kohnstamm insists that assigning blame fairly is a quasi-impossible task. A German soldier saved the life of his father, a Dutch Jew of German origin who wore the yellow star, by warning him of imminent arrest. After the war as a young Dutch diplomat, he traveled through razed German cities and saw little children emerging from the ruins: "To speak of forgiving these innocent young people would have been ridiculous." In 1947 Gustav Heinemann, a future FRG President, and the theologian Martin Niemöller welcomed Kohnstamm to Germany as a delegate of the Dutch Reformed Church, "people who did not have any blood on their hands." The Nuremberg trials, the denazification programs imposed by the occupiers and the sizable reparations Germany paid to war victims met the requirements of justice. The Germans atoned for their past also by renouncing dictatorship, adopting a democratic constitution, and electing men like Adenauer who had not been compromised with the Nazi regime. "We trusted Adenauer and if a few of his collaborators were former Nazis, we accepted it. All this would have been unthinkable if we had not been entirely turned toward the future. We had much to accomplish together."<sup>117</sup> But every so often the desire for revenge lurked, even in the mind of someone as discerning as Kohnstamm. Negotiating the ECSC Treaty in Paris as a member of the Dutch delegation, and having dinner with Walter Hallstein, the head of the German delegation, was not easy. Two of Kohnstamm's aunts had died in Auschwitz and so had the parents of Etienne Hirsch, Monnet's closest collaborator. Kohnstamm recalls vividly an incident in Luxembourg after he became secretary-general of the ECSC:

The window of my office opened right above a bridge crossing a very deep ditch in the middle of the city. One day I was eating my sandwich when I saw a young man who was walking alone, in a raincoat, which resembled a Nazi uniform. The thought flashed through my mind: 'Why not push him in the ditch!' I was shocked by my reaction.<sup>118</sup>

Some of the senior initiators of the European integration process were less wary than Rabier and Kohnstamm to acknowledge the "forgiving" element of the process. Schuman, born a German citizen in Lorraine and trained, like Adenauer, as a lawyer in German universities, sat in the French National Assembly from 1919 to 1940. With a large majority of his colleagues, he voted full powers to Maréchal Pétain in July 1940, but he refused to participate in the Vichy government and was arrested. After escaping from Germany in 1942 he lived clandestinely until 1944. It was in his capacity as foreign affairs minister (1948–52) that he promoted the Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community. What was needed between France and Germany was "a detoxification from history books." This is why Schuman proposed to "extend our hand to our enemies not simply to forgive, but to build together the Europe of tomorrow," which was an "undertaking of peace" beyond "antagonism and resentments." At last, both countries had made "mutual sacrifices" to amicably and entirely eliminate their differences.<sup>119</sup>

Alcide De Gasperi is the least well-known "hero" of the European integration's founding, partly because his extensive writings are only being made available now (in Italian), and the English-speaking world has paid "superficial" attention to him.<sup>120</sup> Like Schuman he was a man of the frontiers, having started his career as a member of the Habsburg Diet in Vienna. The Trentino region of Austria became Italian after WWI, and De Gasperi lived for almost 20 years in internal exile under fascism. He re-emerged in 1943 to found the Christian-Democratic Party, and became prime minister in 1945. He was known, in spite of a rather abrupt personality, as a mediator in Italian politics where he opposed the outlawing of the powerful Communist Party, supported an amnesty for ex-fascists and negotiated an agreement with the German-speaking Alto Adige. In European politics his most original initiative was his proposal for a European Political Community, in the name of peace, which the French National Assembly rejected with the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954. Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier's personalist theories influenced him and, as a staunch Catholic believer who supported a secular state in the same way as Adenauer and Schuman, there is no reason to doubt that he shared also their convictions on personal accountability and forgiveness of enemies.<sup>121</sup>

Monnet, whose massive pre-war archives were burned by the Germans during the occupation, had not received the formal education of an Adenauer, De Gasperi or Schuman; neither did he share their fervent Christian convictions. He was more reticent to expose his inner motivations, and simply wrote of his passion to "unite people." His 500-page *Memoirs* has no comments on virtue although it mentions the daily solitary walks, which helped him think.<sup>122</sup> Rabier remembers him as a "man of action who adopted a lifestyle favoring reflection."

Religion deals with the transformation of behaviors. Regarding faith Monnet stood as if he was facing a mountain or a cliff; he was interested, but not involved. But, consciously or unconsciously he was doing spiritual work. To reconcile people implies necessarily a spiritual connotation. This transforming vision was more conscious in Adenauer and Schuman. What I find



interesting is that Monnet thought that human behaviors could change. It is not self-evident that institutions contribute to change in behaviors and reciprocally. Some of Monnet's collaborators were personalists, others were moved by the economic realities of the time, but all were convinced that we could not make progress on a purely political path. It worked thanks to the pressure of material necessity, which was not the essential concern for Monnet. As for me I had the feeling to act as a citizen and a father, my Catholic faith was not a primary motivation. In any case, Christians have no privileges, only supplementary duties. Agnostic humanists had other motivations: to avoid war.<sup>123</sup>

There were never any philosophical conversations in Monnet's entourage according to French economist Jean Fourastié; he was a man focused on action with no time to waste on abstract debates: "I have the impression that he wanted to limit himself, at least with us, to political, administrative and economic problems, which was already a considerable undertaking." The point was to try, starting from the tensions between men, to limit the dramatic and disorderly character of life.<sup>124</sup>

Once only in his *Memoirs* Monnet mentions the harm lack of forgiveness may cause in international affairs. He condemns the "negative attitude" of the French Minister of Defense Jules Moch who "like some others, had never forgiven Germany for the crimes committed by the Nazis." This attitude was proving "untenable," so that France had to take a new, bold initiative "in transforming the situation as a whole . . . and remove the controls and restraints on Germany faster than we had planned."<sup>125</sup> The bold initiative, another brainchild of Monnet, became the Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community.

Was Monnet's reticence a way to deflect painful memories, with the unforeseen result that it would also deflect the mourning that Ricoeur associates with faithfulness to the past? Arendt would not have faulted Monnet, nor Kohnstamm and Rabier, for not revealing or analyzing publicly their innermost motivations. The human heart should be protected from public scrutiny lest it becomes "an object of suspicion rather than insight;" indeed, we can never be sure even of our own motives. Arendt cited the example of Robespierre, whose insane mistrust of others "sprang ultimately from his not so insane, but quite normal suspicion of himself" and led to the excesses of the Terror.<sup>126</sup> Action manifests its goal and principle, but not "the innermost motivation of the agent." Arendt, according to Margaret Canovan, drew from her encounters with totalitarianism the lesson that goodness was politically irrelevant: "Conventional morality had been no impediment to political evil . . . The only adequate answer was, she [Arendt] concluded, a political one: the agreement of citizens to establish and to maintain a republic based on equal rights for all."<sup>127</sup>

### ***"Oases in the desert:" grassroots initiatives for European reconciliation***

Scholarly literature on conflict resolution tends to view top-down reconciliatory processes (truth commissions, trials, reparations, public apology) as antagonistic

or at least detached from bottom-up processes (community initiatives and individual healing), according to David Bloomfield. "But a strong argument can be made to see them [reconciliatory processes] as complementary, mutually related and mutually supporting."<sup>128</sup> Although European integration is most often discussed as an elite process,<sup>129</sup> a surge of grassroots movements provided the necessary affective underpinning to reconciliatory processes in Western Europe after WWII. Indeed, the principle of reconciliation could not have shaped a new kind of European politics without popular roots. Because Arendt was intensely critical of representative democracy, the process of negotiation and parliamentary ratification, which gave the ECSC its legitimacy, may have struck her as falling short of her exacting standard of participatory politics.<sup>130</sup> Arendt herself recognized that her concept of public engagement might work best in a small society, and some commentators discount her contribution to modern democratic theory altogether.<sup>131</sup> Jeffrey C. Isaacs offers a more sympathetic interpretation: Arendt took for granted that representative democracy was here to stay and merely advocated for a complement to this political form. Her "elementary republics," be they the councils of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the student and the civil rights movements of the 1960s, or the labor movement, are meant to "invigorate" democracy, not replace the institutions of representative democracy. They are like "oases in the desert" and members of the participatory "elite" select themselves.<sup>132</sup>

[They] are counterposed to the masses. But the counterposition is not between a privileged few and an incapable many. It is not between two classes or types of people as much as between two competing *attitudes*. . . . But this is not a derogation of average people. It is an invitation, perhaps even an incitement, for them to surpass their ordinariness simply through their voluntary association and concerted action."<sup>133</sup>

After WWII, grassroots initiatives established public spaces of interaction where citizens could account, forgive, promise and mediate. They did not represent majoritarian opinion, but another kind of "elite," perhaps more genuinely political than elected politicians; the spaces they inhabited were like Arendt's "oases in the desert." Grassroots activism sometimes overlapped with official action, but in the more intimate settings offered by trade unions' meeting halls, churches and non-profit associations, small and large shifts in attitude could occur away from the glare of publicity. Like the state-led initiatives, these grassroots networks were transeuropean, not exclusively French and German. "All kinds of religious, cultural and political associations started to speak with each other after the war," says Jacques-René Rabier.<sup>134</sup> The World Council of Churches, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and Pax Christi brought former enemies together. Joseph Rovani, a former prisoner of Dachau, founded in 1945 the International Bureau of Liaison and Documentation, an organization dedicated to Franco-German reconciliation. In 1949 the French-German Institute of Ludwigsburg was created to serve a "real political and cultural interpenetration" between the two countries.<sup>135</sup> And there were also many youth meetings. French Member of the

European Parliament (MEP) Michel Rocard traces back his interest in European integration to a European Boy Scout camp, which he attended at the age of 16 in 1946. Belgian MEP Fernand Herman helped organize a meeting of 9,000 European students in 1958, who dismantled the wooden gates at the Franco-German border near Strasbourg, a "symbolic and fantastic" event.<sup>136</sup>

Edward Luttwak documents the role of one NGO, the Moral Re-Armament movement (MRA, today renamed Initiatives of Change, IofC), which relied on the work of hundreds of volunteers from all walks of life. One hundred Swiss families pooled their savings to buy a dilapidated hotel in the village of Caux, Switzerland, and rehabilitate it with the express purpose to serve European reconstruction. In the years immediately following the war between 1946 and 1950 MRA brought together in Caux 1,983 French citizens and 3,113 Germans. Among the French visitors were three cabinet ministers (François Mitterrand was one of them) and other government officials, 200 trade unionists, 207 industrialists, 35 clergy, 30 media representatives and 100 from education including two university rectors. From the FRG, 82 came from government circles, including Konrad Adenauer, 400 were trade unionists, 210 industrialists, 14 clergy and 160 media representatives. The participation of French and German coal industry representatives from labor and management was strong.<sup>137</sup> According to Luttwak, these encounters dovetailed with the launching of the ECSC in a "classical case of serendipity." Jean Monnet, the initiator of the ECSC, did not have contact with MRA (although Schuman and Adenauer both did). However, "it was certainly a crucial advantage for the politicians and bureaucrats on both sides that many leading French and German coal and steel industrialists and trade union leaders had already developed warm personal relationships at Caux." Luttwak concludes that "MRA did not invent the Schuman Plan but it facilitated its realization from the start."<sup>138</sup>

The work of self-transformation could be excruciatingly painful. French journalist Françoise Giroud, whose sister had spent years at the Ravensbruck concentration camp, traveled as a young peace activist to a conference in Germany. But when she heard German spoken at the station she could hardly get out of the train.<sup>139</sup> One of the organizers of the Caux Conferences, Leif Hovelsen, a former student member of the Norwegian resistance who had been incarcerated and brutalized by the Gestapo for several years, later worked for reconciliation between Germany and Norway and spent some years in Germany. His autobiography *Out of the Evil Night* describes the encounter between a former French resistance fighter, Irène Laure, who had become a socialist member of the French Constituent Assembly, and a group of young Germans in Caux in 1947. Laure had come to Caux suspecting a capitalist trap, and her suspicion turned to revulsion when she saw Germans there. She had seen the bodies of her friends in mass graves, and her youngest children almost starved to death. But the question of Frank Buchman, MRA's American leader, stopped her from leaving Caux immediately: "As a socialist what kind of unity do you want for Europe?" With her bags already packed, she struggled through three sleepless nights between holding on to her hate or giving it up.<sup>140</sup> Meanwhile, the German youths had made up their mind that if Laure expressed her justified hate for Germany publicly they would remind

her of the exactions committed by the French occupying forces in the Black Forest. But Laure surprised them. She asked to speak at a meeting and said only three sentences: that she had so much hated Germany that she had wished it erased from the map of Europe; but that she had understood that her hate was not justified; and that she would like to ask all Germans present to forgive her for it. One of the Germans, Peter Petersen, who had served in the Nazi Youth Movement, describes the emotional turmoil this simple declaration provoked in him:

For several nights I could not sleep. My whole past was in revolt against the courage of this woman. I suddenly realized that there were things for which we, as individuals and as nations, could never make restitution. Yet we knew, my friends and I, that she had shown us the only way open if Germany was to play a part in the reconstruction of Europe. The basis of a new Europe would have to be forgiveness, as Madame Laure had shown us. One day we told her how sorry we were and how ashamed we were for all the things she and her people had to suffer through our fault, and we promised her that we would now devote our lives to work that such things would never happen again anywhere.<sup>141</sup>

Petersen would eventually become an influential member of the German Bundestag. For Irène Laure the Caux speech was only a beginning. From January to March 1949 she crisscrossed West Germany, speaking 200 times in public, and in 11 of the 12 state parliaments. Every time she asked for forgiveness for her hatred in order "to restore Germany to a place in the family of nations, and to inspire the youth with a vision of a future to be built, rather than with dreams of revenge." Her son Louis, a former resistance member, rebelled like others among her fellow resistance fighters; and she chose to explain herself publicly at a meeting of 5,000 persons arranged by a Socialist trade union friend in Lille, France: "I know I may offend many of you. For weeks my heart ached, when I spoke in Germany. But I made penance. Our task is to take the first step towards the Germans so that what happened before can never happen again."<sup>142</sup> Existential philosopher Gabriel Marcel writes of Laure's experience as an "event-principle" or "event-source," which impacts others like "radioactivity." At a time when "experts are unable . . . to solve the basic problem, that is to establish a peace worthy of its name," Caux provided "emergency help" and "healers."<sup>143</sup> For Joseph Montville, Laure made a "noteworthy contribution to a public environment," which facilitated Franco-German reconciliation and eventually led to the creation of the European Community.<sup>144</sup>

Therefore two kinds of initiatives, mostly uncoordinated, yet compatible, drove the first post-WWII European reconciliation, those of the state and those of civil society. The first addressed primarily material interests and state security, the second affective issues and self-transformation. The grassroots practices, like the elite initiatives, included: accounting for the past; unexpected acts of forgiveness, for instance the Laure speech in Caux and her subsequent visits to the FRG's state parliaments; promises such as the young Petersen's response to Laure; and

external mediation from Swiss, Americans, Canadians, Swedes, and others. They relied on volunteer work and financial donations to support programs and may have inspired efforts toward the fair rearrangement of economic relations, which only state-led initiatives could implement. From the start the European reconciliation process was multilateral. France and Germany, in spite of their central role in launching the European integration process, have no monopoly on it; nor does the EU today. Like the Indian experiment in non-violent liberation politics and the South African exercise in transitional justice, European reconciliation(s) represent a set of experiences and memories whose inheritors need not be defined by nationality, ethnicity, or geography.

### Part III A contested legacy

#### *The two logics of European integration: turning memory on its head*

I asked some EU decision-makers, on the eve of the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo, whether Arendt's reflections on forgiveness and promise were still relevant in politics. Spanish MEP Enrique Barón Crespo lived through the transition to democracy in Spain "which was founded on forgiveness and promise;" and he experienced the "most moving moment" of his political career when he voted for the laws of amnesty in the Cortes (Spanish legislature) in 1977. He added, "Arendt is still relevant today. I share the frustrations of most of my colleagues regarding the situation in the Balkans. The method that we followed in the EU is the only solution there too."<sup>145</sup> For German MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit, whose parents were close friends of Arendt, the experience of forgiveness between France and Germany, which made European reconciliation possible, is still necessary in Northern Ireland, in the Basque country, in Bosnia. "I often talk about it. Moreover political forgiveness is the basic justification for amnesty laws." Arendt inspires his political thinking: "Our big challenge is to overcome the reduction of politics to the economic. The primary mission of Europe is political, cultural and social."<sup>146</sup> The issue of reconciliation was pressing for Austrian MEP Reinhard Rack. Being the only representative for Styria in the EP, he got letters and petitions from constituents asking for restitution now that Slovenia (until 1918 Southern Styria) was acceding to the EU. After WWI, borders were drawn arbitrarily and German-speaking citizens suffered discrimination and loss of property there. Rack agreed that "grievances must be dealt with if we want to live together in a community," but he also told his constituents that they must be satisfied even with partial compensation. "At some point you have to draw the line and put an end to past history. Forgiveness is part of the game."<sup>147</sup>

Swedish MEP Ivar Virgin took a prosaic view: "Forgiveness is an experience necessary in daily life, so it is also naturally part of the international process. In the short run countries have to accept unfavorable deals for themselves and must try to get over it. But such instances should be minimized."<sup>148</sup> And others described the impulse behind the European integration process primarily in instrumental terms. Austrian MEP and lawyer Maria Berger, who helped negotiate her

country's accession to the EU, stated: "In everyday politics principles as such do not count very much. A peace agreement is about the right balance of interests. Even the integration of the coal and steel industries was a very pragmatic way to prevent war." Belgian MEP Fernand Herman, an economist by training, agreed that peace was part of the EU's "charisma," but it was a "rational process:" "We obtain from European integration the benefits we hoped to gain in earlier days though war. . . . The causes of resentment are so old that political and economic rather than spiritual considerations are the motor of the process."<sup>149</sup>

French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges summed up best the complexity of the debate on the respective weight of ideals and interests in European reconciliations by detecting "two logics" in the project, one "rationalist, utilitarian, Benthamian," the other "affective, based on memory and forgiveness." He admitted to an almost Freudian concept of Europe:

The EU is the superego of the nation-states, imposing on them the mastery of their nationalisms, of their ethnic urges. The EU represents the victory of reason over folly, of law over force. The 'European ethic' resides in the realization that we defend our interests only by taking into account the others' interests. This is the Benthamian logic, which is the opposite of the logic of forgiving and promising which is essentially affective.

Bourlanges recalled that Simone Weil drew her "European faith" from her experience in Auschwitz; she saw only two solutions, kill all Germans or create a united Europe. So Arendt had an important point to make. "There is also in the EU the idea that union is born out of the remembrances of sufferings imposed and received. Forgetfulness is the beginning of disunion. In effect, because I remember I forgive."<sup>150</sup> Arendt does not link memory with forgiveness, nor does she conceive the logic of forgiveness and promise as affective. Promise and forgiveness manifest themselves as political initiatives in the public sphere. But in the past Europeans went to war in the name of memory. Bourlanges' assertion that to remember is to forgive shows to what extent the substantive content of European memory has been turned on its head, at least for some European actors.

#### *A lasting "chain reaction of reconciliations?"*

In *The Rebirth of Europe*, Pond describes the "miracle of the present chain reaction of reconciliation in Europe."<sup>151</sup> In order to qualify for membership in the EU, Hungary and Romania signed a peace treaty dealing with the tricky issue of the Hungarian minority living in Romania; there have been official reconciliation processes between Germany and Poland (recognizing as permanent the post-WWII borders between the two countries) and Germany and the Czech Republic (putting to rest the claims of the Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia after WWII). In this context, Pond argues that the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia constitute a tragic "exception," and that four decades of teamwork between Western European nation-states have been "habit-forming."<sup>152</sup>

Long-standing enmities, however, do not die a quick death. Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman revived painful controversies in January 2002 when he called the Sudeten Germans "Hitler's fifth column." Reacting immediately, right-wing politicians in Germany and Austria asked for the abolition of the 1945 Beneš decrees that legitimized the expulsion, as a condition for Czech accession to the EU. The uproar was such that German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had to cancel a state visit to the Czech Republic in March 2002.<sup>153</sup> French vice-president of the European Parliament Catherine Lalumière warned that to "reopen this dispute could lock in Czechs, Slovaks, Germans and Austrians." Why not reopen also the territorial disputes between Germany and Poland over Silesia (today Polish territory), or between Italy and Slovenia? "This would mean putting the finger in a suicidal chain of events for Europe. The founders made of reconciliation a priority . . . we will not erase what happened, but we will turn the page."<sup>154</sup>

Austrian MEP Maria Berger, whose constituency in Upper Austria included a large number of descendants of the Sudeten Germans, also spoke of "turning the page." Three years earlier she had described the integration process as primarily interest-driven; in 2002 she stressed the importance of reconciliation for the current enlargement. Understandably many of her constituents would have liked to see their sufferings acknowledged by the Czech government, but they did not expect monetary compensation, well aware that they have prospered in Austria much more than would have been possible in Czechoslovakia. Berger, thus, did not make of the cancellation of the Beneš decrees a condition for Czech accession. "It takes a long time for a country to confront its past. We know something about this in Austria. . . . The EU is the solution to historical conflicts . . . cooperation instead of blame."<sup>155</sup> The legal experts consulted by the EP agreed that, "the confiscation on the basis of the Beneš decrees did not raise an issue under EU law, which has no retroactive effect," and a repeal of the decrees did not seem mandatory in the context of accession. However, they found "this law repugnant to Human Rights and all fundamental principles" and were "of the opinion that the Czech Republic should formally recognize this."<sup>156</sup> The Czech Republic did not heed this recommendation, and the Parliament accepted the experts' report supporting Czech accession, in effect ending this controversy.

Some worry about the loss of the ECSC legacy. German MEP and president of the EP Delegation for Relations with Southeast Europe Doris Pack regretted that in Western Europe "European peace politics" have "unfortunately" become "normalized, and taken for granted." She told the story of the seven-year-old son of a German constituent who came home one day saying that his teacher had gone crazy because during the class she mentioned wars between France and Germany. Even the 35-year-old father had trouble remembering. Yet when she went to Bosnia, Pack felt she had the authority to speak of the forgiveness that took place among WWII former belligerents. "In Bosnia people have not forgiven for 600 years. Forgiveness is a Christian word which is not the property of Christians, and goes way beyond religion."<sup>157</sup>

### *Skeptics*

The idea of drawing ideas from the ECSC's experience to solve current conflicts is not new. The 1993 proposals of the Delors Commission for regional cooperation in the Middle East "reflected strikingly the spirit of Monnet and Schuman and of Europe's own experience after World War II." In the wake of the Oslo Agreement the Commission suggested that regional cooperation between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt should focus on pooling common capacities to tackle common problems, particularly water, energy and transportation. It proposed establishing the basis of a Middle East economic area with free movements of goods, services, labor and capital.<sup>158</sup> The 1995 Euro-Mediterranean partnership provided a broader scheme for interregional cooperation. But the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the resumption of violence on both sides in 1996 brought the negotiations for interregional cooperation to an end "before they had even started."<sup>159</sup>

So, the idea that the ECSC experience may suggest initiatives to solve current conflicts can meet skepticism among some of the most experienced founders of European integration. This was the reaction of Rabier when he was asked about the long-standing conflicts between Greece and Turkey in spring 1999. He noted the long "maturation" of the reconciliatory process, which began to involve French and German political actors of the left and the right and Catholic and Protestant religious personalities in the 1920s already. "I am not sure such a process has taken place between Greece and Turkey. Monnet is no longer here. It would take EU representatives to go on the spot and tell the decision-makers: We love you, but, please, love each other a bit better."<sup>160</sup>

Former EU Commission president Jacques Delors also denied the relevance of an Arendtian interpretation of the ECSC founding for contemporary conflicts, especially in the Western Balkans: he recalled accompanying the EC president Jacques Poos to Belgrade in 1991. The two EC representatives encouraged the six Yugoslav republics' presidents to form a "loose confederation," even if they wanted separation. "We offered them a treaty of association with the European Community if they did so. But we could not convince them. The logic of hate and rejection of the other took over. It was no longer the Arendtian logic."<sup>161</sup> Still, Delors' response was not a dismissal of Arendtian thought:

Even perhaps without having read Arendt, the European Founding Fathers implicitly applied her maxims. As recently as 1995, when speaking about Europe to the giants of history who were finishing their careers, [German] Chancellor Kohl and [French] President Mitterrand and many others who had known the awakening of Europe in 1948, one heard them respond 'never again war between us,' which implies a promise and forgiveness. That French and Dutch people, freed from concentration camps, could create links with Germans right after the war, this is true greatness.<sup>162</sup>

In politics opinions change as Arendt stresses. Delors revisited his interviewer's questions less than a year later in two major speeches, the second celebrating

in Luxembourg the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1950 Schuman Declaration. He stated that if Europe had remembered its “treasure,” the “virtues of promise and forgiveness borrowed from Hannah Arendt,” it would have dealt with the Balkans issue quite differently. Arendt illustrated the thought and action of French Foreign Affairs minister Robert Schuman even though she wrote eight years after he acted:

Forgiveness without forgetfulness, promise to allow the other not to sink into despair or revenge. Let us think of what strength these maxims might carry if they were applied in Bosnia and Kosovo. . . .

We must therefore find in the Balkans, on both sides, men and women whom we could trust to face the principle of forgiveness and develop together a promise, of course, with the support of nearby countries, among others Bulgaria and Romania. But this was not done because the little light – the treasure I spoke about – is no longer shining.<sup>163</sup>

More “prosaically” Delors asked why one of the “recipes” of the ECSC, the pooling of economic resources, was not applied to Kosovo and its neighbors, which would compel them to develop common institutions to administer their material exchanges. He concluded that forgiveness and promise together form a “project,” which is part of the “legacy” left to the European people.<sup>164</sup> Delors has not developed these ideas in more detail since, although he has mentioned them again and refers to Arendt.<sup>165</sup>

For his part, Polish MEP Bronislaw Geremek regretted that during the EU’s Fiftieth Anniversary celebrations of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, the very “origin of European integration was left in the shadow:”

After all, 1950 preceded 1957. In the German–French rapprochement, the most important work, which matters historically, was not the will to build around coal and steel, but the transcending (*dépassement*) of recent memories. . . . The EU has paid little attention to issues of reconciliation in Kosovo, which has been handled as a political issue and a question of international law. Reconciliation cannot be imposed by decree. But the EU’s offer of accession to both Serbia and Kosovo implies a future made possible by reconciliation.<sup>166</sup>

Whether there is an ECSC “treasure” of reconciliatory practices, and how it should be put to good use, will remain two highly contested questions as the statements of “witnesses” demonstrate. It is a matter of “opinion,” just as it should be in politics and political theory.<sup>167</sup> Chapter 3 offers a way to think through the evocative, but indefinite statements of Delors and Geremek on the relevance of the ECSC example to the conflicts in the Western Balkans. It retraces also another lively debate of opinion within the EU over the constitution of a common memory, which EU citizens could share, in order to identify with each other politically.

### 3 Remembering the principle of reconciliation

#### “Applications”

#### Introduction

The principle of reconciliation is fragile in that its effectiveness depends entirely on the actors’ willingness to implement it. There is no easily accessible blueprint of what the post-WWII reconciliatory practices may offer for the solution of current conflicts. At the time of writing Spain and the UK are still arguing over Gibraltar; the parties in Northern Ireland are sorting out many issues related to their conflict; there are tensions between Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, Italy and Romania, and this list is not exhaustive. Moreover, in 2004, in a major breach of its reconciliatory tradition and policies, the EU accepted the accession of the still divided Republic of Cyprus.

Florence Hartmann claims that the “EU success story” required a strong belief that Europe could “only be united if it learns about and from the crimes and horrors of the past.”<sup>1</sup> This assertion sounds credible in hindsight, and supports Hartmann’s belief in the importance of transitional justice, but it has little to do with the facts as they stood in 1950. The practical politicians who founded the ECSC reconciled around a practical project that served material and political interests, not around memory. Wolfgang Petritsch and Vedran Džihić acknowledge the danger of “depolitisation” of the memory process. Reconciliation must address the structures of political power, social inequality and exclusion that constituted the framework within which the violence of the old order was both perpetrated and endured.<sup>2</sup> Part I of Chapter 3 expands on Delors and Geremek’s reflections on the Western Balkans. It consists of a hermeneutical exercise in pondering the “application” of the EU founding’s reconciliatory practices – accounting for the past, forgiving, promising, structural transformation and the mediation of a third party – to the unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. What might this mean in terms of state-led policies and grassroots initiatives? This story is meant to highlight the way collaborative projects around concrete objectives can promote peace, even if not all the policy suggestions offered below convince.<sup>3</sup>

There is something right about Hartmann’s argument, however. Reclaiming memory is a form of reconciliation, and this is the way Arendt theorized it. The work of memory is not a singular political act like promising and forgiving, but rather a mental and civic activity undertaken for the sake of the “world,” where

human beings engage with one another about shared purposes and commitments. It corresponds to the attempt to make oneself at home in the world.<sup>4</sup> Arendt does not encourage the work of memory because of its immediate political consequences; political action is more effective to fight totalitarianism than remembering. Yet "understanding" the past, a continuous and unending exercise, is essential to the formation of political identity and empowers the actor.<sup>5</sup> Part II of Chapter 3 offers several stories of action that illustrate Arendt's concept of reconciliation as a form of remembrance: collaborations between MEPs and academics; initiatives of EP staff members; the attempts to create museums of EU history; and classroom scenes in one of the four Brussels European Schools.

## **Part I Remembering the ECSC to consider the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia**

### *Comparing histories*

A major concern of the ECSC partners was to chart an original course that would limit the excessive dependence on the two superpowers vying for hegemony, and yet contribute to the security of all.<sup>6</sup> They had no model to follow for reconciliation: the ECSC was their brainchild. Could there be a successful *pax balkanica*, once again initiated by those primarily involved?<sup>7</sup> There seems to be little similarity between France and the FRG in 1950, and Kosovo and Serbia in 2010. Yet, in 1950, the sovereignty of the FRG was still contested by some governments, as Serbia and Kosovo's sovereignties are currently. When the ECSC treaty was negotiated, there was no peace treaty between the former European belligerents; East Germany was under Soviet occupation and the Saar had become an economic province of France. An international administration supervised the Ruhr *Gebiet*, and all European countries were struggling to recover economically from war's depredation. The occupying powers were deeply divided on the future of Germany, and the Western Allies could not agree on the partial rearmament of West Germany, which the US and UK supported and the French opposed, just as today there is not full international consensus on the future of Kosovo.

The emotional wounds were very deep also. Arendt stressed in 1947 that a way out of "fanatical hatred" had to be found, with some "model of how human beings can speak with each other despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge."<sup>8</sup> During a 2005 seminar for Serb and Albanian Kosovars organized in Strasbourg around the post-WWII Franco-German reconciliation, one participant remarked how the fact that "reconciliation is possible even after much suffering and hate" gives "hope." Another noted the similarities between Alsace-Lorraine and Kosovo's histories, two regions torn apart by major powers' rivalries across several centuries: "This contextualizes our own problems because we see that we are not the only ones left in the world with such a history." Nicolas Moll, one of the organizers, describes the French-German experience as a "motivator," not a model to emulate, whose remembrance impacts French and German as well as Western Balkans actors when they dialogue about it.<sup>9</sup>

There can be no thinking through a historical legacy without some understanding of its inheritors' circumstances. A historical reminder of recent events in the Western Balkans is in order,<sup>10</sup> although no such account can avoid controversies,<sup>11</sup> the first regarding when to start. A major turning point was 1989 when Serb leader Slobodan Milošević forcibly incorporated the autonomous province of Kosovo into the federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After resisting non-violently, Albanian Kosovars set up an armed resistance movement (KLA) in the late 1990s, which provoked increased repression from Serbia. Confronting the expulsion of the entire Albanian population from Kosovo, NATO started a controversial bombing campaign against Serb troops in March 1999 without UN authorization.<sup>12</sup> After Milošević withdrew his troops, Albanian Kosovars returned to their devastated homes and, in June, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 set up a civil administration, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), supported by a NATO-led military force (KFOR) to facilitate the transition of Kosovo to a final status that might satisfy both its Serb and Albanian populations. Several elections have taken place in Kosovo since, largely boycotted by the Serb minority. Violent demonstrations in March 2004 involving 50,000 anti-Serb demonstrators increased the Serb exodus from Kosovo.<sup>13</sup>

Internationally sponsored talks between the Serbs and Albanian Kosovars met with little success, and in March 2007 UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari recommended "independence" for Kosovo, "supervised for an initial period . . . by international civilian and military presences."<sup>14</sup> In February 2008 Kosovo declared its independence, which the US and 22 EU Member States have since recognized. Kosovo's independence, but Russia, and EU Member States Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain have not. In spite of its divisions, the EU Council under Slovenian presidency "acknowledged" the independence of Kosovo in February 2008 and agreed to send EULEX, a force of 2,000 police officers, prosecutors and judges to help train local police and organize customs and the courts. But the EU mission, which started on 9 December 2008, declared itself "status-neutral" regarding Kosovo, to the dismay of Albanian Kosovars and, because of Russian opposition on the Security Council, UNMIK cannot cede its international mandate to EULEX.<sup>15</sup> On 22 July 2010 the UN International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence violated no international law or UN resolution. Meanwhile, the remaining Serbs in northern Kosovo (120,000 Serbs live in UN-protected enclaves in Kosovo) have developed parallel political institutions.<sup>16</sup> Commentators (see authors cited above on Kosovo history) agree that the prospect of EU accession may be the only way out of intractable differences.

Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe with a per capita income of 250 euros a month. Half of its 1.9 million population is under 25. It has a weak administrative capacity and there are few industrial resources except for the vast but dilapidated Trepça/Trepča Mining Complex. Serbia, with a 10.8 million population, is struggling to recover from the destruction of infrastructure by NATO bombing and to integrate over 200,000 Serb refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo left from the half million who came in the 1990s. And in Kosovo it was estimated that there were still 19,000 internally displaced persons in 2010.<sup>17</sup> Both countries suffer from organized crime and a high level of unemployment.<sup>18</sup>



**Pax balkanica: accounting for the past***Transitional justice*

The next three sections discuss the prospects of *pax balkanica* by using the post-WWII reconciliatory practices (see Chapter 2) as an analytical framework. This should be understood as a heuristic rather than a prescriptive exercise. Arendt and the ECSC founders stressed action in concert and promise rather than justice, whereas Jaspers emphasized the personal aspect of accountability, and supported international trials against war criminals. Arendt did so somewhat less enthusiastically as she noted the double standard of "victor's justice."<sup>19</sup> Since the 1950s, and especially after the 1995 South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there has been an international learning process in transitional justice. In a process reminiscent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, justice is being delivered in fits and starts in the Western Balkans through trials. Radovan Karadžić, the infamous Bosnian Serb leader, is in the hands of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), following Slobodan Milošević and other Serbs. At the time of writing the last major Serb perpetrator, Goran Hadžić, was sent to The Hague. In 2005 former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj surrendered himself voluntarily to the ICTY and was exonerated from charges of human rights violations and released, to be rearrested later. The Croats delivered General Ante Gotovina to the ICTY. According to Pond, it is significant that local judges in all Western Balkan countries are trying and convicting defendants of their own ethnicities.<sup>20</sup> Jelena Subotić argues, however, that Serbia has subverted the international norms of transitional justice for instrumental purposes, such as securing candidate status for accession to the EU, and is in fact "rejecting the profound social transformations these norms require." She calls for more international involvement in socializing and rewarding domestic elites to "open the black box of the past" in a responsible manner.<sup>21</sup>

*Scholars' initiatives*

It took sixty years for the Germans and French to adopt a common textbook to teach their high school students.<sup>22</sup> But in the Western Balkans historians and teachers are already hard at work to confront clashing memories: the Southeast European Joint History Project has published four workbooks for university and secondary school use, translated into seven languages. The Thessaloniki-based Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe supported the Project with the collaboration of four dozen Balkan historians. For the Albanian language edition, 53 teachers attended two training workshops in Pristina and Prizren in February 2009.<sup>23</sup> Although no exact causal relationship can be established between the teaching of history and the reduction of conflict, school history teaching and the contentions over curriculum disturb rigid mindsets and encourage "interactive pluralism" – that is, a willingness to regard the political environment as a shared space. As Margaret E. Smith writes, perhaps the best that can be expected from

school history teaching is a "refusal to propagate lies." And a society has to find other ways to digest its past before it can be adequately expressed didactically.<sup>24</sup>

*Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars' Initiative*, published in 2009 by Purdue University Press and the US Institute of Peace, is another bid to assist the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to stand back and take as objective as possible a look at the events in their region in the period 1985–95. By mobilizing over 300 scholars (75 of them of ethnic Serbian origin) to research, write and critique accounts of significant episodes, the Scholars' Initiative (SI) steps back from promoting nationalist agendas and thus questions or debunks narratives and mythologies.<sup>25</sup> It maintains that none of the players can overcome the culture of victimization so long as their democratically elected politicians remain bound to the mutually exclusive wartime narratives that unite their countries' electorates. No national constituency will be more uncomfortable than the people of Serbia (and their cohorts in Bosnia's Republika Srpska) as they confront the findings of this research, according to editors Charles Ingrao and Thomas E. Emmert, which lay responsibility for Yugoslavia's dissolution with the destruction of the constitution by Slobodan Milošević. In autumn 2010 the Bosnian translation of the book was launched in Sarajevo and sold at the Belgrade Book Fair.<sup>26</sup>

**Pax balkanica: forgiving, promising and the fair reorganization of economic relations**

If forgiveness is understood with Arendt as a novel action (rather than a feeling), breaking with the past, and paving the way for political (re)connection, what might correspond for Kosovo and Serbia today to the post-WWII joint administration by six countries of coal and steel, key resources for re-armament? Only Kosovars and Serbs can answer these questions. Journalist Dan Bilefsky has suggested that the Trepça/Trepča Mining Complex could offer a ground for action in concert instead of remaining an apple of discord.<sup>27</sup> In the 1980s this complex included 40 mines, foundries and subsidiary plants, with vast mineral resources of coal, nickel, lead, zinc, cadmium and bauxite, spread between Northern and Southern Kosovo; it employed a mixed Albanian and Serb workforce of 20,000 workers and generated 25 per cent of the entire regional industrial production. Milošević fired thousands of Albanian Kosovars, and the mines fell into disrepair after the NATO campaign; the complex resumed partial operations to cover maintenance costs only in 2005 under UNMIK.<sup>28</sup> As of 2010 there were two authorities directly involved in deciding its future: Kosovo's Albanian authorities and the UN-run Kosovo Trust Agency, which oversees privatization. There is still disagreement over the sell-off of the mine and how much of it should remain in state hands. Moreover, "agreement with Serbia is needed," and the leadership of the two countries have little contact with each other.<sup>29</sup>

Both Serbs and Albanian Kosovars consider themselves to be victims, according to Moll, and either could initiate Arendtian forgiveness and promise by proposing an entirely new way.<sup>30</sup> Of course, "symmetry in responsibilities" should not be confused with "symmetry in culpabilities."<sup>31</sup> But could the Trepça/Trepča

Mining Complex be jointly administered by independent and respected personalities from Serbia and Kosovo? Could there be a "High Authority" accountable to the parliaments of both countries, to supervise the fair management of the mines? Its budget could invest in the retraining and housing for workers, and be made up of a small tax paid by the complex. Decisions of the Trepça/Trepča Mines' High Authority would carry weight in Kosovo and Serbia, with a Court of Justice adjudicating disagreements between institutions and the two governments. The promise could consist of a Treaty on the Trepça/Trepča Mines, ratified by the parliaments. Just as the French and German governments decided to bracket the issue of the Saar temporarily, in a letter attached to the ECSC Treaty, a similar device could be used to bracket the issue of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, or of Kosovo over Serbian-majority parts of its territory. This issue could be decided in a few years through new referenda supervised by international authorities, once habits of cooperation and trust have been established and economic interests are clearly seen as being served by the Trepça/Trepča Mines Treaty. Even if, as Bashkim Iseni argues, Kosovo would never accept to run the mines with the Belgrade government as an equal stakeholder, he acknowledges that this might be done with representatives of the Serb community in Northern Kosovo.<sup>32</sup> In any case, political forgiveness, understood as Arendt did – re-engaging with the enemy in path-breaking actions in concert for the sake of the shared political future – does not require feelings of amity, and certainly not forgetfulness, which would make any deeper "understanding" impossible as well.

#### ***Pax balkanica: the EU – mediator or actor in concert?***

One way to interpret the US role in the late 1940s is that it used its hegemonic position benevolently to help open a space for forgiveness and promise between Germany and France by supporting the Schuman Plan and providing the first large loan to the ECSC.<sup>33</sup> What might the EU do to protect such spaces in the Western Balkans today? The Brussels-based Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which steered over 25 billion euros toward the Western Balkans, stimulating a modest increase in intraregional trade, is a partial answer to this question.<sup>34</sup> The Pact was "transferred" from Brussels to Sarajevo in February 2008 through the creation of the Regional Cooperation Council with increased regional leadership and financing.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro are official candidates to the EU, and Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia have all signed pre-EU accession agreements. The first state-sponsored reconciliation between France and Germany was not merely a bilateral process, as it included Italy and the Benelux countries; EU accession prospects guarantee that Serbia and Kosovo also will not be left alone facing each other.

The presence of observers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in all EU institutions constitutes an important socializing process. The EP, especially, offers a space for non-violent confrontation: some of its members sat down in May 2008 with Kosovo Parliament President Jakup Krasniqi, and Serbian Parliament Speaker Oliver Dulić, to speak of the shared

future, immigration and visas, and the role of parliaments in European integration. Thirty-two-year-old Dulić stated: "For my generation and me, as for the majority in my country, the crucial regional stake is the process of historical reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs." Krasniqi responded that the prospect of EU accession was the common future.<sup>36</sup> According to Doris Pack the EP is seeking training and education programs initiated from the Western Balkans that it can support.<sup>37</sup>

#### ***Self-transformations: oases in the desert***

It is too early to assess fairly the extent and impact of reconciliatory initiatives at the elite level in the Western Balkans. In what is seen as a significant gesture, Serbian president Boris Tadić went to both Srebrenica in Bosnia and Vukovar in Croatia in 2010 to offer apologies to the victims of massacres by Serbs. In March of the same year, Serbia's parliament passed a landmark resolution apologizing for the Srebrenica massacre, saying Belgrade should have done more to prevent the tragedy. Meanwhile, some Serbs protest that their own losses are not sufficiently acknowledged.<sup>38</sup> Marek Antoni Nowicki, the international ombudsman who held UNMIK and local authorities accountable for human rights abuses from 2000 to 2005, notes that local populations in Serbia and Kosovo are not ready "to forgive and be forgiven" today because "civil society . . . has not had the strength to face the darkest parts of the past."<sup>39</sup> This should come as no surprise. Among the citizens of the ECSC/EC/EU, facing up to the past and the healing of emotions has unfolded over several decades, even if stable peace was established much faster at the political level.<sup>40</sup> Retrospectively it is tempting to make light of the emotional and political pressures they confronted. Laure, the socialist member of the 1946 French Constituent Assembly, spoke for many when she admitted, "I never forgot the sight of the atrociously mutilated bodies of my fellow resistance fighters exhumed from a common grave." The Norwegian Leif Hovelsen, who spent four years in a Nazi concentration camp, took revenge by mistreating the German prisoners of war entrusted to his care after the liberation. Through much soul-searching, Laure and Hovelsen became involved in reconciliatory programs toward Germany, braving the ire of some of their friends who could not understand.<sup>41</sup>

At the grassroots level, Arendt's "elementary republics," whose principled involvement supports democracy and reconciliation like "oases in the desert," are present in Serbia and Kosovo.<sup>42</sup> A "very small Western-oriented elite" in Belgrade now argues explicitly that Serbs must first of all transform their mind-sets and confront their past. Young activists work with the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and Helsinki Committee.<sup>43</sup> The Center helped found in 2008 the Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations in the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM). The aim is to create an official and objective account of war crimes, covering the period 1991–2001. After Kosovo's declaration of independence, some victims' associations refused to attend RECOM's Fourth Regional Forum in Pristina, Kosovo. But the Serbian Association of the Families of the Kidnapped and Killed in Kosovo and Metohija and its leader, Sima Spasić, defied official pressures. In Pristina, Spasić condemned

the Serbian government's attempt to "abuse our tragedy" and acknowledged Albanian victims, while asking for acknowledgment of Serbian victims.<sup>44</sup> From Mitrovica, the ethnically divided city of Northern Kosovo, Community Building Mitrovica (CBM) has sponsored more than 200 multi-ethnic, grassroots-level reconciliation projects in the region. Ali Ahmeti, an Albanian Kosovar, runs the NGO Peace Doves in Southern Mitrovica with a partner organization in the North. They sponsor inter-ethnic dialogues, programs of economic integration, and services for women and children. The community-policing force funded by UNMIK trains volunteers of different ethnic background to solve community problems in 20 districts across Kosovo.<sup>45</sup> Since 2000 the bilateral Franco-German Office for Youth has supported over 200 training programs, which discuss critically French-German reconciliation processes with thousands of students, teachers and NGO activists throughout the Western Balkans.<sup>46</sup> The work of memory often highlights tragedies and trauma.<sup>47</sup> But it can serve many other purposes: revenge, atonement, finger-pointing, celebration. Here it waxes pedagogical to incite to action.<sup>48</sup> This is remarkable so few years after deadly conflicts.

## Part II EU clashes of "understanding"

### *The work of memory and the "capable" citizen*

The work of memory matters to the formation of individual and political identity. On this Arendt and Ricoeur agree. But Ricoeur offers a more detailed and systematic analysis of the work of memory than Arendt. At best, to remember, singly or collectively, is to enter the hermeneutical circle, to follow a trajectory that leads from personal memory to the professional work of historiography, and eventually back to the "happy memory" of the "capable citizen."<sup>49</sup> Although Ricoeur does not offer a detailed definition of the term "capable" in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, we can infer from the texts that this is a citizen able to think and take political responsibility with integrity, someone with an identity who can act in the world with and for others.<sup>50</sup> The adjective "happy" does not mean giddy with joy, but reconciled with self, at peace.

Only the work of mourning heals repressed memory, and Ricoeur wishes for the labors of mourning and memory to be placed under the sign of justice, because justice is by definition other-oriented. Everyone owes a debt (inseparable from the notion of legacy or tradition) to those who came before them. "Pay the debt, I shall say, but also inventory the heritage."<sup>51</sup> But is Freud's "work of mourning" only required of individuals or does it also matter to collective memory? Some think that collective memories should not be psychoanalyzed, "nations can repress with psychological impunity."<sup>52</sup> Ricoeur is more nuanced: no therapist is available for "interhuman relations," but "the public space of discussion constitutes the equivalent of . . . 'the play ground' as the intermediary region between the therapist and the analysand." Ricoeur is critical of the current "obsession with commemoration" that too easily displaces history in favor of "the particular, the fragmented, the local."<sup>53</sup> Yet commemorations have their positive side: they can act like

Freudian talking cures, which eventually substitute for compulsive repetitions of past events, "allowing for healthy memory;" this process requires much patience.<sup>54</sup> The last part of this chapter discusses a few initiatives for remembrance (or Arendt's "reconciliation") on the basis of field research in Brussels in 2008. Scholars warn against the danger of a homogenized Brussels-manufactured memory.<sup>55</sup> The evidence discussed here should put any fear of uniformity to rest, at least for now. Even if actors could agree that sharing some common memories is a good thing, the debates over the content of these memories will not be settled soon.

### *The use and abuse of history*

In the EP living memories confront each other, especially since the 2004 and 2007 accessions of 12 new Member States. "We saw that it is easier to unite economies than to unite memories," says Polish historian and MEP Geremek.<sup>56</sup> Creating a "European narrative" is an urgent task because "common memory is the basis for a sense of shared identity."<sup>57</sup> MEPs are just beginning to grapple with the diverging mindsets that shape everyday action, and they sponsor an increasing number of projects on memory and history: books, exhibits and even the creation of a large museum by 2014. Financed by political groups, think tanks and the EP, these projects offer a fragmented view of the past rather than unitary mindsets.

Austrian MEP Hannes Swoboda and Dutch MEP Jan Marinus Wiersma joined forces to edit *Politics of the Past: The Use and Abuse of History*, a thought-provoking and too little-known attempt by scholars and a few politicians from 20 EU Member States and Russia to dialogue and disagree about memory and history.<sup>58</sup> Although the EP Socialist Group and the Austrian Renner Institut supported the seminars and the book that followed, the volume does not represent the Socialist Group's official position. Its purpose is to seek "in depth understanding," to "learn from the past," and "find meaning," and it includes the contributions of well-known scholars such as Norman Davies, Bronislaw Geremek, Pierre Hassner, György Konrád and Martin Sabrow.<sup>59</sup> Wiersma, a historian by training, insists that politicians and historians have fundamentally different responsibilities. Mixed committees of historians are best equipped for debates on the past and can assist politicians in evaluating the requirements of post-conflict justice.<sup>60</sup> Members and colleagues of the courageous Mixed Committee of Hungarian-Slovak Historians have contributed several chapters.<sup>61</sup> Language remains a topic of strife between Hungary and Slovakia, which in 2009 forbade the use of Hungarian in public in districts with less than 20 per cent ethnic Hungarians.<sup>62</sup> Which language to use in schools is also highly controversial. The editors claim some credit for the fact that in February 2009 the Slovak Parliament voted an amendment to the School Act, which puts geographical names in minority languages in front of Slovak names in minority school textbooks.<sup>63</sup>

Another hot button issue is how to assess fairly whether Western European Socialists were too soft on the Eastern European Communist regimes during the Cold War.<sup>64</sup> Wiersma admits the "illusion" existed among Western social democrats like himself, who for a while hoped to build bridges between Communist

parties and dissidents. Therefore, Polish MEP Józef Pinior's invitation to the EP Socialist Group to visit Gdansk in 2008 was politically significant: it brought together representatives of working-class movements who held profoundly different views on Communism but fought for freedom.<sup>65</sup> This act of recognition was especially important to Spanish MEP Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez who, as a Spanish socialist, felt betrayed by the passivity of Western democracies toward the Franco regime. He joined the opposition young in the late 1950s, and had to live in exile. He spent nine years in Vienna where he treasured the friendship of Central and Eastern European dissidents in a similar situation.<sup>66</sup> The book airs other conflicts in a similarly balanced vein, warning against the "use of national identity as a means of destruction." Thus Lithuanian historian Česlovas Laurinavičius critiques both the Lithuanian practice of calling Russia the "evil empire" and the Russian strategy of economic and energy strangulation put in place against Lithuania. "The key threats resulting from this escalating confrontation, that I want to stress here, are not so much economic or even military but rather psychological."<sup>67</sup> The book, a work of memory and history that addresses current issues and suggests pathways for the future, departs from more strictly backward-looking acts of remembrance.

***EP's memorialists of the Group of the European People's Party and the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats***

Memory can be self-congratulatory. When the the Group of the European People's Party hired its long-time advisor Pascal Fontaine, and several graduate student assistants, to write its history, it did expect a "celebratory" chronicle. Fontaine strived not to lapse into the hagiographical mode. He wished for his *Voyage to the Heart of Europe 1953–2009* to help open a critical debate on the Group's activities and, at the same time, saw his role in keeping with a "family tradition:" his father François Fontaine assisted Monnet in writing his *Memoirs*. Daunted by the number of potential interviewees – 1,080 former MEPs and civil servants since 1952, and another 500 current MEPs and civil servants – and the impossibility of assessing which "memories" might be the most reliable, Fontaine organized his book around three chronological periods: the pioneers (1952–79); the builders (1979–94); and the reformers (1994–2009). His approach is anthropological like Marc Abélès (1992), but from the point of view of an insider who started working at the EP in 1980: "People have trouble grasping how the EP functions. To explain the rules, the customs, the culture, even taking into account conversations in the elevators, is a contribution to the democratization of this institution."<sup>68</sup> While Fontaine offers tantalizing insights on many controversies, such as the difficult negotiations which forced the federalist Christian-Democratic Group to morph into the Group of the European People's Party that includes Euro-skeptics,<sup>69</sup> his "duty of loyalty" prevented him from doing more than to indicate questions worthy of further inquiry. There is little of the self-questioning tone of Swoboda and Wiersma's volume.

Ambroise Perrin, an advisor on the European Neighborhood Policy to the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (formerly the

Socialist Group) in the Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Delegation for Central Asia, offered to memorialize the Group's activities in a very different way. With roots in both France and Germany, he has long been interested in questions of memory.

At the most practical level memories go missing in the European Parliament. . . . Few even remember what happened during the previous legislature. This may be a sheer problem of organization. But I wondered whether the whole European enterprise, by abandoning the idea of vengeance, had become grounded in forgetfulness.<sup>70</sup>

Perrin proposed the creation of a museum featuring the Socialist Group's activities since 1979. Because of the Group's "future-oriented identity" he encountered resistance and eventually got a modified proposal funded: a "playful" mobile exhibit made up of lightweight panels on wheels, which will be put at the disposal of the 27 Member States' socialist parties (with one permanent exhibit in one of the Group's rooms at the Brussels EP building). Each panel consists of a pictorial montage featuring a photograph of a Socialist MEP with a picture of the object that represents his/her most satisfying political initiative. Thus Danish MEP Richard Baffe chose a car key and is shown at the wheel of a Volkswagen minibus sporting the slogan "Yes to Maastricht." This is the same vehicle that the Socialist Group bought in 1989 to support the campaign of East German "comrades" in favor of the reunification of Germany.<sup>71</sup>

***Museums of European history***

In spite of their interest in memory, Arendt and Ricoeur have little to say about museums, which could be considered as "traces" of the past.<sup>72</sup> Arendt denotes a certain commonality between the statesman and the artist's activities. Both political and artistic "products" require the light of publicity to be validated in a world that is common to all; art museums, like churches, other holy places and monuments, provide a protective public space for art objects "against the possessiveness of individuals."<sup>73</sup> What about historical museums? Their action-oriented conception of memory and history may have prevented Arendt and Ricoeur from showing interest in such institutions. In Brussels much more ambitious museum projects than Perrin's mobile exhibit were under way in 2008. They were expected to fulfill a dual role: besides being repositories of the past, they would act as prompters of debates on the present and the future involving the youth.<sup>74</sup> EP Vice-president Martínez Martínez represented the EP with a "more radical and secular view" on the committee of nine experts (directors of museums and historians) commissioned by the EP to lay down the "conceptual basis" for a House of European History. The museum is expected to open in 2014 with its main exhibit on the post-1945 period and two shorter sections on Europe before 1914 and the interwar periods. Martínez Martínez feared that time might be too short.<sup>75</sup>

The museum should not be a juxtaposition of memories, like a book with 27 chapters, each devoted to a different country. . . . But in none of our countries, especially those with a dramatic history, have we succeeded in writing a national history, not even in quiet and peaceful Belgium.

How then to agree to a common conception among so many divergent memories?<sup>76</sup> Martínez Martínez found especially disappointing the efforts by some Eastern and Central Europeans "to dramatically simplify the Cold War by depicting it as a fight between gangsters and policemen." They find it impossible "to understand and accept that the Cold War justified the Western support of fascist dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal." Franco's police arrested Martínez Martínez when he was 19 and he was condemned to 20 years in prison. He waves his hand where some fingernails are missing as a result of torture and asks for the sufferings of fascism's victims to be equally recognized. "But such facts cannot even be mentioned. Fair enough, communism was unacceptable elsewhere." Yet the attempt to establish a House of European History has been worth the trouble:

The European construction is an ocean and we are talking about a small river. We are perhaps no more than 20 people talking about this here. This is a modest education project, with a modest budget. But the process has its own dynamic and it is one of the many initiatives started to educate the young. Memory is about the future. The European construction started as an antidote to war, but the process has been so successful that the younger generation has no idea that war is possible. Only if we build a union, which acts as an influential and consistent global actor, will we be able to defend both our welfare and world peace.<sup>77</sup>

Martínez Martínez' experience during the Spanish transition to democracy, when his generation "had the privilege of accomplishing in twenty years what took hundreds in other countries," may be what encourages him to persevere. Paraphrasing Ricoeur (without citing him) he adds, "I want to bring testimony, to be a witness. To say, yes it was like that, no it was not like that, to prevent the falsification of history."<sup>78</sup>

The Committee lists the main topics that the permanent exhibition should cover and makes no mystery of the "political" nature of its mission in its report to the EP.<sup>79</sup> Surprisingly the report lists Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak, two well-known secular public figures and in the case of Spaak, a Socialist, among the "Christian-Democrat politicians." The Franco-German reconciliation is traced back primarily to the actions of Adenauer and De Gaulle in 1963; and the 1989 revolutions are described as leading to the Eastern and Central European countries' return "in terms of their national history . . . to the mainstream."<sup>80</sup> The meaning of the term "mainstream" is left unspecified, which should provoke healthy controversies. Moreover, the timeline of European history does not mention the eight centuries of Arabic presence on the Iberian peninsula and its role in reconnecting Europeans to their Greek roots; neither is there mention of the Ottoman Empire except

for one reference to "the long period of Turkish domination," which exerted "a major influence on European history *through* the great European powers, first of all Austria and Russia and then also France and Great Britain." What about Greek, Romanian and Bulgarian histories?<sup>81</sup> The last room in the museum will encourage visitors to think of the future, with questions that might change over time "so as to make clear to visitors how open the situation is" and at the same time allow them "to react in the short term to new developments."<sup>82</sup> A new Academic Committee appointed by the EP in December 2008 was to develop the conceptual basis further. It is to be hoped that it will work on the historical misinterpretations mentioned above.

Antoinette Spaak, a former Belgian cabinet minister and member of the Belgian and European Parliaments, shares Martínez Martínez' passion for educating the young. She chaired the board of another museum project, the Association pour le Musée de l'Europe, which Israeli historian Elie Barnavi and Belgian businessman Benoît Remiche founded in 1996. It ran a large exhibit on European integration between January and March 2007 in Brussels: "C'est notre Europe" attracted 150,000 visitors. The central idea was that not only elites but also citizens with "fascinating stories to tell" make modern Europe.<sup>83</sup> Starting in 1945 the exhibit confronted frankly the bellicose past of Europe, and called the unification of Europe (1948–51) a "revolution," which broke with the age-old formula "woe to the vanquished." It also covered the years 1945–2007 from a sociological point of view with rooms depicting the way people lived in Eastern and Western Europe in the 1950s and 1980s, and portraits of the major figures of European history, including Stalin. When a Belgian historian critiqued the newly opened exhibit for "being too Christian," this triggered a passionate debate with Barnavi. "The discussion did not change the exhibit; Barnavi stuck to his concept of the Christian origins of European integration." But Spaak, the daughter of the staunchly secular Belgian Foreign Affairs minister Paul-Henri Spaak who chaired the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome, thinks, "This is a fundamental discussion that must be pursued."<sup>84</sup> Some efforts were made to establish a dialogue between the expert committee for a House for European History and the academic committee advising the Association for a Museum of Europe, with little success, and the goal of the Association is to open another permanent museum. So far, securing a site has not been possible in spite of long negotiations with the Brussels regional government and the EP.<sup>85</sup>

### *Preparing to celebrate the 90th Anniversary of the 1918 Armistice at the European School II*

The cacophony of memories and ways to remember, which confronts the academic interviewing in Brussels' EU institutions, demonstrates the liveliness of debates on memory and identity among Europeans. Ricoeur celebrates the constant debates that surround important historical events:

By acknowledging that the history of an event involves a conflict of interpretations and memories, we in turn open up the future. And this

retrieval-projection of history has ethical and political implications. Different political projects concerning the future invariably presuppose different interpretations of the past.<sup>86</sup>

Debates on the meaning of the past must start in the classroom, as Smith points out. The lectures of two French teachers at the Brussels European School II offered a study in contrasts on the eve of the 90th Anniversary celebration of the 1918 armistice. The school, like eight other similar establishments (four just in Brussels), educates the children of EU civil servants; it provides its 2,893 students with elementary and secondary education in nine languages. Jeanne S. is a historian specialized in the medieval history of the French South, who teaches social studies to high school seniors. The day's topic was the geography of European cities. There was no mention at all of the celebration of the armistice, when the school would be closed. Jeanne S. knew little about European integration until she asked to be "detached" to Brussels by the French Ministry of National Education. The first time she had to vote for the EP election, the experience "totally" surprised her. Teaching in Brussels had been transformative. She would miss the international milieu when her seven-year contract ended; on the other hand she was constantly challenged, which she has experienced as destabilizing and exhausting. "What seems evident to me is not at all evident for those facing me."<sup>87</sup> Far from overlooking the next day's celebration, Bertrand I., who hailed from Alsace like Ambroise Perrin, spent almost an hour in preparing his 26 six-year-old students from Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, the USA, Britain and Spain to commemorate the 1918 Armistice. He shared memories of his grandfather who died young during the war among the six million dead. "During those wars Europe lost," Bertrand I. told his pupils. He assigned as homework, to find documents on the armistice and to visit a monument to the dead, and added, "To avoid war, the Germans and the French decided to make peace. This included many every day gestures." The class did not learn more about these "gestures" except for the fact that the EU flag's 12 stars stand for cooperation and equality and that French and Germans celebrate with Swiss neighbors the armistice in Alsace. Some children volunteered enthusiastically that they had great-grandparents in their nineties who had survived "all the European wars."

### Conclusion: "Soft messianism" vs. humility

Remembering concrete political achievements is fraught with one major danger, to encourage *hubris* in those who claim the legacy exclusively. Moll and Lévy stress the *humbling* role of memory in the EU: the actor who remembers manifests compassion, the capacity to "suffer with." The post-WWII state-led and grass-roots initiatives in Europe serve as flawed exemplars whose "witnesses" share remembrance "of the especially demanding and painful character of managing suffering and contentious pasts."<sup>88</sup> But Arendt warned against an excess of compassion; she trusted only solidarity, an egalitarian mindset that establishes a "community of interest with the oppressed and exploited."<sup>89</sup> Undoubtedly references to

reconciliation and peace can legitimize a kind of "soft messianism." When he was EU president in 2001, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt contrasted the "softer power" of the EU with the United States' unilateral and arrogant power, evidence that the EU had learned "lessons of humility" from its dramatic past. Valérie Rosoux worried that this show of humility could turn into new forms of paternalism.<sup>90</sup> Jacques Dewitte's *L'exception européenne* discusses "*ces mérites qui nous distinguent*" (these meritorious features that make us distinctive) and singles out the capacity to admit the wrongs European civilization has committed, whereas other peoples and cultures do not manifest this aptitude.<sup>91</sup> The notion of European exceptionalism implies a hierarchical distinction between more or less virtuous actors, which is inimical to the egalitarian and rule-based order that the EU purports to support within and without. Mill's concept of "originality," the courage of non-conformism and acting in ways never or rarely done before (like Arendt's natality) would seem more appropriate.<sup>92</sup>

External observers are often the best positioned to assess the value of a political experiment.<sup>93</sup> R. Pavanthi Vembulu is prompt to denounce European integration's cultural imperialism, and he critiques also the "Indian academic's uncritical importation" of Western theories of integration, which re-circulate old colonial discourses on the universality and uniqueness of the European model.<sup>94</sup> Yet every so often the ECSC is remembered as a signpost of hope in the most unexpected quarters. Pakistan's ambassador to the Netherlands, Mustafa Kemal Kazi, spoke as a sharp critic of the EU immigration policies and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which are turning the EU into a "fortress state." However, when asked how he would explain to an illiterate but intelligent Pakistani farmer the meaning of European integration, he surprised the interviewer:

I would adopt a historical perspective to explain how European countries after two great wars decided to confront their differences and solve them. There is here a lesson in regional cooperation, which we could learn from. An important ingredient of this reconciliation was the sharing of material resources, coal and steel. The European experience transmits to us a vision of optimism.

Kazi added that oil could be used in South Asia the way coal and steel was in 1950s Europe.<sup>95</sup> Contradictory debates on the political relevance of European integration for other parts of the world keep the experiment alive for its direct inheritors also. This chapter has offered a discussion of the relevance of the ECSC legacy for the Western Balkans today, and stories of reconciliation as remembrance. European and non-European actors are tapping into memory and history for various purposes: to overcome current conflicts; to celebrate; to define new political traditions; and to break from a warring or colonial past. These constant exercises in understanding challenge old identities and test the patience of all involved. Under such conditions, how can action in concert continue to develop within the EU and beyond? The next chapter seeks to answer this question.



- 56 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 279.
- 57 Alasdair MacIntyre stresses that the behavior of political actors cannot be understood independently from their intentions, which are themselves linked to specific settings, be they a practice, a historical context or an institution. MacIntyre in Sandel, 1984, 128.
- 58 Berlin, *Against the Current*, 138.
- 59 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 234–5, 21.
- 60 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 184; *Men in Dark Times*, 21.  
Charles Taylor writes; “Making sense of my present action . . . requires a narrative understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in a story.” Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 48.
- 61 Ricoeur insists on the “plausibility” of the testimony in *Memory*, n. 24, 531.  
Arendt’s stories did not always score very high for accuracy. Margaret Canovan finds the story told in *On Totalitarianism* “something of an embarrassment: a brilliant, ambitious and highly questionable interpretation. . . . But it reveals insights from which we can learn even if the story lacks persuasiveness.” Canovan, 1992, 279–80.
- 62 Maxwell, 1996, 70.
- 63 Melchionni and Ducci, 2007.
- 64 Having turned to memoirs, essays and interviews of European initiators to learn about the “ECSC/EC/EU tradition,” I assume that these documents are not mere acts of deception, but the genuine expression of their authors’ views.
- 65 Maurice Halbwachs’ most famous work is *The Collective Memory*.
- 66 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 393–7, 411.
- 67 Gaffney, 1999; Shriver, 1995; Schmidt, 2006.
- 68 The tricky question of levels of analysis will be revisited in the next chapters. Here it should be understood that when the name of an agent is a nation, such as “Italy signed a treaty,” it represents the Italian government’s official action. See also pages 85–6, 87, 88, 92, 181 n. 61.
- 69 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 166.
- 70 These narratives do not “copy” the event recorded, but “stand for” it. Ricoeur, *Memory*, 279.
- 71 Arendt, *On Revolution*, 207–13 and 272–3. See also Chapter 4.
- 72 In order to make the comparison with Habermas convincing, it is necessary to “disassociate” Habermas’ model of constitutional making from his broader theory of discourse ethics according to Kalyvas, 2008, 251. This seems a high cost to pay.
- 73 Habermas, *Justification and Application*, 35–8.
- 74 For Arendt’s discussion of German values, see Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” in *Responsibility and Judgment*. On action, see Arendt’s endorsement of the Resistance’s proposals for the postwar reintegration of Germany in a united Europe in *Essays in Understanding*, 114–20.
- 75 See, *inter alia*, de Gruchy, 2002; Shriver, 1995; Wink, 1998.
- 76 On forgiving and promising, see Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 236–47; *On Revolution*, 164.
- 77 Balibar, 2002, 80–1; Glucksmann, 1997, 32, 19.
- 78 Pjer Zalica, *Fuse (Gori vatra)*. Global Lens Festival, Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, 1 October, 2005.
- 79 Arendt, *Essays in Understanding*, 308.
- 80 While expressing repeatedly his admiration for the new European politics of peace, “a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration – on both sides of the Atlantic,” Kagan argues that Europeans could step out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian “paradise” of international law only thanks to the military protection of the United States. Kagan, 2004, 97, 75.
- 81 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 199–205.
- 82 For the interviews, see Melchionni and Ducci, 2007.

- 83 Nicolaidis, 2004, 102.
- 84 The bitter spat between Germany and Poland’s leaders at the EU Summit of 22 June 2007 was unusual but not exceptional. Poland’s Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczyński argued that his country deserved more voting rights in the new EU Reform Treaty because without the bloodshed caused by Germany in WWII Poland would have 66 million people, not the 38 million it has today. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier responded that the Polish argument was an unjustified use of “historical prejudices” and likely to fuel new tensions. Hugh Williamson and Jan Clenski, “Germany hits at Poles’ war claim,” *Financial Times*, Thursday 28 June 2007. See Chapter 6 for similarly tough-worded exchanges between the representatives of Greece and Germany in 2010.
- 85 The *acquis communautaire* is the EU term for all the laws and regulations approved since 1958.
- 86 Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, vol. I, 4.
- 87 Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu, 2006, 286, 291–3.
- 88 Arendt, *Essays in Understanding*, 308. See also Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 34, 47.

## 2 “After the deluge”: the principle of reconciliation

- 1 Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009, 12.  
The Spring 2008 Eurobarometers 69 confirms this trend: Peace, human rights and respect for human life are the three most important values for Europeans. Two of these – human rights and peace – are also, along with democracy, those that best represent the European Union in their eyes.
- 2 Glucksmann, 1997, 32, 19.  
Catherine Lalumière acknowledged the stress put on economic questions when the European Communities were created; she learned about the reconciliatory aspect of European integration only when she joined the Mitterrand government in the 1980s after several decades of political involvement as a senior French civil servant and legal expert. Lalumière, 1999, interview.
- 3 The Copenhagen criteria are respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, alongside administrative capacity and a market economy.
- 4 For interesting discussions on when European reconciliation started and “divergent memories,” see Rosoux in Mink and Neumayer, 2007 and Geremek in Wiersma and Swoboda, 2009.  
Like this author, Diez, Albert and Stetter choose the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community as the starting point of state-led initiatives for reconciliation. Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008, 2, 4.  
Others argue for the 1957 Treaties of Rome, or the 1963 French–German Treaty of the Elysée, or 1989 as the start of the “reunification” of the whole of Europe. Making the Elysée Treaty the starting point is to forget that European reconciliations from the beginning involved more than two states.
- 5 Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 66.
- 6 Mink and Neumayer, 2007, 252, 19.
- 7 Attali, 1994, 10.
- 8 Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, 72, 76–80.
- 9 Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 70.
- 10 Arendt, *On Violence*, 51.
- 11 Rumelili, 2007, 107; Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 337.
- 12 Mink, 2007, 34.
- 13 Haas, 1958.
- 14 See, *inter alia*, Obradovic, 1995; Laffan, 1996; Manners, 2002; Morgan, 2005; Parsons, 2003.

- 15 Gardner Feldman, 1999a and 1999b; Guisan, 2003 and 2005; Pond, 2002 and 2006.
- 16 Rumelili, 2008, 102, 104–5.

For recent works on the EU as a promoter of peace and reconciliation, see Tocci, 2004 and 2007; Manners, 2006; Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008; Diez and Tocci, 2009; Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and Öktem, 2009.

- 17 Pace, 2007 and 2008b; Tocci, 2004.
- 18 Pond, 2002 and 2006; Rumelili, 2007 and 2008.

Czech President Václav Havel was a major initiator of the rapprochement, which culminated with the German-Czechoslovak Treaty on Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation signed in 1992, and continued after the “Velvet Divorce” between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993.

- 19 Tocci, 2007, 174; Hayward and Wiener, 2008, 33.
- 20 Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008, 4–5; Rumelili, 2007, 120; Hayward, 2007, 679.
- 21 Jarausch, 2007, 11.

Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas suggest that the lack of European memory may be due to an all too successful exorcism of past conflicts. Habermas and Derrida, 2005, 8.

- 22 Arendt, *Essays in Understanding*, 308. Some scholars who mistrust the liberating power of forgiveness discuss reconciliation in similar terms. See Brudholm, 2008, 116; and for a more elaborate discussion of this topic, see Prager in Prager and Govier, 2003.

- 23 Arendt in Young-Buehl, 2004, 405.

- 24 Arendt, *Essays in Understanding*, 318. For more on Arendt and story-telling, see also Hill, 1979, 287–98.

- 25 Diez, Albert and Stetter conceptualize the influence of the EU on border conflicts by distinguishing between the EU compulsory impact on policy, its connective impact on society, its enabling impact through the financing of common activities, and its constructive impact on the underlying identity-scripts of conflicts. These four “pathways” are interconnected. Albert, Diez and Stetter in Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008, 24–9. Tocci discusses “conditionality” as a mechanism whereby a reward is granted or withheld depending on the fulfillment of an attached condition, on the basis of five case studies. The other “mechanisms” through which the EU exerts its influence are “social learning” and “passive enforcement,” or rule application. Tocci, 2007, 10–27. Of course, these scholars do not argue that the EU always plays a positive role to promote peace, rather they provide analytical frameworks to assess the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the EU’s current policies and strategies for peace-making.

- 26 For a more elaborate discussion of the relationship between acting and thinking in politics, see Chapter 7.

- 27 Milward, 1984, 465.

- 28 Judt, 2005, 13–62.

- 29 Barrington Moore, Jr. in Couture, Nielsen and Seymour, 1996, 124, 125 and 131–2.

- 30 Boismorand, 2007, 189–206.

Jacques Maritain cites German poet Heinrich Heine who reminded his French friends in the early nineteenth century that German grievances had more ancient roots than the French cared to remember. German memories reached as far back as 900 AD when the French beheaded Konrad of Staufen in Napoli. “You have surely forgotten this incident long since,” wrote Heine. “But we forget nothing. You see that if ever the idea comes to us to make contact with you we will not lack plausible justifications . . . Remain on your guard.” Maritain, 1993, 172.

- 31 Historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle in Roussel, 1996, 491.

- 32 Keylor, 1992, 286.

- 33 Arendt, *Essays*, 216.

- 34 Maritain, 1993, 34, 46.

- 35 Rieben, 1987, 53–8.

- 36 Citations from the Schuman Declaration. Fontaine, 2000, 36.

In spite of the long-standing enmity between France and Germany, there were several attempts at European reconciliation, mostly initiated at the elite level, after WWI. The first initiative was French and “aimed at fitting Germany into a framework of international economic agreements.” Gillingham, 1991a, 1. In 1918 French Minister of Commerce Etienne Clementel, assisted by Jean Monnet, proposed to his Anglo-Saxon allies to keep in place the system of wartime economic cooperation, and to progressively include Germany in it. But Britain and the United States were not interested; and in the “face of this abrupt return to economic nationalism,” France was driven to exact more reparation payments from Germany, and in 1923 its armed forces even occupied the Ruhr to ensure the supply of German coke and coal to the Alsace-Lorraine steel mills. The 1925 Locarno Agreement, which conceded the permanence of the German loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland in exchange for the evacuation of allied troops from the Cologne zone and a scaling down of the occupation forces elsewhere in the Rhineland, was another important step in the rapprochement between Germany and France. US business and finance circles supported the 1924 Dawes Plan, which injected a huge amount of American capital into Germany to help the Germans pay war reparations and more. As a result, the International Steel Cartel was formed in 1926 and remained an active forum for exchanges between French and German steel producers even in the 1930s. The 1929 Wall Street crash put an end to the Dawes Plan. For William Keylor, “the evidence of a genuine French desire to cooperate economically with Germany, particularly in the critical metallurgical sector (where French iron ore complemented German coking coal) suggests an opportunity for Franco-German reconciliation that was tragically lost.” Keylor, 1992, 83, 122, 92.

- 37 Schuman, 1964, 88, 91, 106.

- 38 Poidevin, 1986, 208.

- 39 Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002, xxxi; Herf in *ibid.*, 275–94. For a similar argument, see Wolffsohn, 1993.

- 40 On transitional justice in Europe, see Allcock, 2009; Kostovicova, 2010; and Subotić, 2009.

- 41 The Western Allies did not stop Hitler in the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Japanese in Manchuria, or Mussolini in Abyssinia. They remained “deaf” to all alarm signals. Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt*, 90–7.

- 42 Jaspers in Schilpp, 1981, 12.

- 43 Jaspers, *The Question*, 22.

- 44 *Ibid.*, 60–3.

- 45 *Ibid.*, 118–23.

Metaphysical guilt assumes a realm of world solidarity where every person feels responsible for any wrong committed anywhere.

- 46 Jaspers in Schilpp, 1981, 68–9.

- 47 Jaspers’ war and postwar experiences convinced him that philosophy could not be dissociated from politics: “It was no accident that National Socialism, as well as Bolshevism, saw in philosophy a deadly spiritual enemy. . . . Only after I became deeply stirred by politics did my philosophy become fully conscious of its very basis, including its metaphysics.” Jaspers in Schilpp, 1981, 70.

- 48 Judt, 2005, 271.

- 49 For positive evaluations of Adenauer’s record on this score, see Habermas in Krzemiński, 1994, 24, 26; Herf in Hedetoft and Herf, 2002, 277–9; Wigton, 1963, 17.

Jaspers and Arendt were harshly critical of Adenauer. See Arendt’s letter to Jaspers in Kohler and Saner, 1992, 479. Jaspers, however, felt that West Germany owed Adenauer a debt of gratitude for helping prevent a communist take over. Jaspers, *The Future of Germany*, 25–6.

- 50 Adenauer, 1967, 127.
- 51 Adenauer, 1966, 39.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Adenauer 1967, 141, 145.
- 54 For an estimation of the value of the compensations paid by the FRG before reunification and by Germany since, see Shriver, 1995, 89.  
In November 2007 Germany declared its willingness to discuss making extra pension payment to Holocaust survivors because at the time of the 1952 agreement, the exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union and the expenses of caring for them into their old age had not been taken into account. Anshel Pfeffer, "Germany says willing to discuss Holocaust survivors' pensions," *Haaretz*, 15 November 2007.
- 55 There is an ongoing debate on whether the Europeans, and especially the Germans, have atoned adequately. In the last 30 years there has been a surge in narratives of repentance, which have become like a "duty to memory." Kattan, 2002, 19. Some object to this culture of "penitence." Bruckner, 2006, 37–9.
- 56 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 236–47.  
In an interview on German TV in 1964, Arendt explained how she argued with many of her former acquaintances "who had fallen in their own trap" during the Nazi period when she returned to Germany in 1949. "I am not particularly agreeable, nor am I very polite; I say what I think. But somehow relations were set straight again with a lot of people" who were "neither murderers nor informers." Arendt, *Essays*, 14–15. She renewed her friendship with her former mentor and lover, Martin Heidegger, who never admitted to any culpability for his pro-Nazi attitude in the 1930s, and she helped publicize his work in the US. In contrast, Jaspers could never bring himself to renew his acquaintance with his prewar colleague, Heidegger.
- 57 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 236–47.
- 58 Peter Digeser argues that forgiveness is not about eradicating resentment, which may be "too demanding or too intrusive for politics," but about restoring a relationship which has gone wrong. It requires that "the transgressor, once forgiven, be treated in a different way . . . [It] entails a particular kind of conduct." Digeser, 1998, 701, 704.
- 59 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 501. According to Ricoeur, if forgiveness re-establishes a horizontal relationship of equality between forgiver and forgiven, it leaves untouched the vertical relationship between the height of forgiveness and the depth of the fault.
- 60 Brudholm, 2008; Kateb, 1984, 35.
- 61 The hallmark of politics for Arendt is that it is non-violent, not that it eliminates the conflicts endemic to the human condition.
- 62 Vladimir Jankélévitch thinks on the contrary that forgiveness exists for desperate and incurable cases. Jankélévitch cited by Olivier Abel, 1996, 223.
- 63 Digeser, 1998, 707.
- 64 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 489.
- 65 Schaap in Lang and Williams, 2005, 80.
- 66 Lang and Williams, 2005, 226.
- 67 Young-Bruehl, 2006, 140, 143.
- 68 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 237.
- 69 Monnet headed the Commissariat-General of the French Modernization and Investment Plan, a state agency directly accountable to the prime minister, which had been set up by decree in 1946, and he worked in that capacity for ten prime ministers until he was appointed president of the High Authority of the ECSC in 1952.
- 70 Duchêne, 1994, 205.
- 71 Acheson, 1969, 382.
- 72 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178; *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 478–9.
- 73 Poidevin 1986, 260.
- 74 Schuman, 1964, 166.

Syndicated columnist James McCartney wrote in terms reminiscent of Arendt:

- "When I was an American soldier in Europe in World War II, it was impossible to imagine that France and Germany in my lifetime, would not only become allies, but leaders in a drive to unite all of Europe. . . . The French and the Germans' success so far in looking forward rather than back can give hope. The French and the Germans have already proved that miracles do happen." James McCartney, "Collaboration Between Longtime Enemies France, Germany Political Miracle," *St Paul Pioneer Press*, 15 June 1992.
- 75 "Monnet did not talk about forgiveness, but of promise and the future. In Luxembourg we felt that we were building a new community." Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
  - 76 "In terms of law and politics, 'Europe's first experiment in supranationalism' was . . . a latter-day equivalent of the American Articles of Confederation – a forerunner to a far stronger and more permanent union." Gillingham, 1991a, 363.
  - 77 Early business travels to Britain and the United States on behalf of his family's brandy firm had shaped Monnet's political philosophy. He held Anglo-Saxon democracies in great esteem and believed that, "The British have a better understanding than the Continentals of institutions and how to use them. Continentals tend to believe that problems are solved by men. Undoubtedly, men are important; but without institutions, they reach no great and enduring decisions. This the British have long understood. That is why, unlike many people, I had no fear that their accession would upset the working of the Community." Monnet, 1978, 451.
  - 78 Rabier, 1999, interview.
  - 79 Material symbols mattered also. The French Stationary Office had the Treaty of Paris printed on Dutch vellum with German ink; it was bound in Belgian parchment with Italian silk ribbons and Luxembourg glue. Monnet, 1978, 356.
  - 80 Ibid., 356–7.
  - 81 Articles 54–6 and 65–6 in the 1952 Treaty of Paris on the ECSC.
  - 82 Monnet, 1978, 313.  
Arendt critiques state sovereignty in an ambiguous manner. On one hand, when a "single entity," whether an individual or a collectivity bound by an identical will, claims sovereignty, this implies hierarchy and is antithetical to politics. On the other hand, "sovereignty assumes, in the case of many men mutually bound by promises, a certain limited reality." *The Human Condition*, 245.
  - 83 There was a retreat from supranationality in the European treaties following the first Treaty of Paris. The Council of Ministers representing the Member States became the main legislator. From then on the Community procedures "owe much to traditional diplomacy." In the Council the debates are not public and legislation that requires unanimity can easily become "bogged down and deadlocked." Louis, 1995, 42.
  - 84 According to the usual rules of international law, states have an equal right to interpret the treaties, which they have ratified, in order to have their sovereignty protected; in case of conflict they rely on arbitration.
  - 85 The ECJ followed the basic principles of equality, freedom, solidarity and unity in its rulings and relied on the "functional" or "teleological" method of interpretation to choose the interpretation most conducive to further the overall aims of the treaties. Borchardt, 1994, 58–61. As its role became increasingly controversial, the court eventually moderated its constitutionalizing ardor. For more on the early years at the ECJ, see the comments by G. Frederico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe" in Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991. Mancini was a member of the European Court of Justice.
  - 86 Arendt, *On Revolution*, 257.
  - 87 According to the 1949 German Basic Law, "the Federal Republic is ready to transfer sovereign rights to international institutions, and to accept those limitations upon its sovereign rights which will produce and secure a lasting peaceful order in Europe and among the nations of the world," in Adenauer, 1955, 11. The 1946 French Constitution stated that, "subject to reciprocity, France may agree to limit its sovereignty where

- necessary for organization and defense of peace." And the 1958 French Constitution refers to the statement on shared sovereignty in the 1946 Constitution. The 1953 Dutch Constitution included a provision for transfer of sovereignty to the Community. The 1956 Luxembourg Constitution, the 1948 Italian Constitution, and the Danish Constitution since 1953 contain similar clauses. Louis, 1995, 171–80.
- 88 Alan Keenan highlights the theoretical tension between the requirements of stability vested in the good constitution and natality in Arendt's thought. Keenan, 1994, 309.
- 89 Monnet drew from his experience with the League of Nations, an organization expected to last forever, the lesson that, "It was important never to break up with anyone so that the process could continue. But it was no point working under the illusion that results would be definitive. Nothing is definitive in life." Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
- 90 Schuman, 1964, 186.
- 91 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this problematic aspect of Arendt's theory of public action.
- 92 Gardner Feldman 1999b, 70.
- 93 It is important to note that Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer supported the doctrines of social Catholicism, which emphasizes social justice and the economic rights of working people. For more on this and De Gasperi, see Capperucci, 2009; Cau, 2009; Lorenzini, 2009; Taverni, 2009.
- 94 Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
- 95 Ibid.
- 96 Steiner in Jarausch and Lindenberger, 2007.
- 97 Daltrop, 1982, 10.
- 98 Gillingham in Brinkley and Hackett, 1991b, 152.
- 99 Gillingham, 1991a, 355.
- 100 Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1994, 650–2.
- 101 According to Dirk Spierenburg, the initially skeptical Dutch representative on the first HA, and French historian Raymond Poidevin, "The Luxembourg melting-pot forged a European team that was more often than not capable of looking beyond the national horizon and serving a broader cause. Many of its members, imbued with this new spirit and fortified by their experience, made substantial contributions to the establishment of the new Communities before leaving Luxembourg for Brussels when the High Authority ceased to exist." Ibid., 654–5.
- 102 Wallenstein, 2007, 266–72.
- 103 Gardner Feldman discusses three other variables: history as the willingness to confront the past; institutions as the building of a new framework for relationship between former enemies; and leadership or the agency of "visionary societal actors." Gardner Feldman, 1999a, 334–6.
- 104 Guisan, 2003, 34, 38; Roussel, 1996, 519.
- 105 Cini in Schain, 2001, 32; Judt in Schain, 2001, 7. The Marshall Plan had a number of indirect effects: it facilitated "the gradual reintegration of West Germany into the West European fold" and "improved the economic conditions that made future efforts at cooperation more promising." It established "transnational elite contacts, both formal and informal," which facilitated "transnational socialization" with a preference for institutionalized multilateral cooperation "in place of the earlier preference for ad hoc bilateralism." Cini in Schain, 2001, 32.
- 106 Roussel, 1996, 518–19.
- 107 Monnet, 1978, 352–3.
- 108 Monnet, 1978, 462 and 390; speech to the ECSC Assembly in Monnet, 1955, 64.
- 109 Gillingham, 1991b, 156; Milward, 1984, 420.

However, the ECSC did not establish the beginning of supranational governance, which Monnet had hoped for. Nor did it manage to dismantle the German coal and steel cartels. Gillingham, *ibid.*

- 110 Dominique Moïsi critiques the persistent academic resistance to account for emotions in international relations. Moïsi, 2008, 44.
- 111 Monnet, 1978, 291.
- "Men who are placed in new practical circumstances, or subjected to a new set of obligations, adapt their behavior and become different. If the new context is better, they themselves become better: that is the whole rationale of the European Community, and the process of civilization itself." Ibid., 389–90.
- 112 Adenauer, 1966, 331.
- 113 Jacques-René Rabier, a senior French civil servant, was Monnet's *directeur de cabinet* in the French Planning Commission (Commissariat du Plan) and at the ECSC High Authority. He became *directeur de cabinet* of Monnet's successor, René Mayer. In 1960 he became head of the Directorate X, responsible for information and the press relations of the three European communities (EEC, Euratom and ECSC). Rabier took early retirement in 1973 but volunteered for the Commission. In this capacity he created the Eurobarometer after training in polling methods in the US with Ronald Inglehart, and he remained active with Directorate X until 1990. Max Kohnstamm became a diplomat for the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry after spending much of the war years in prison. In 1952 he joined Monnet in Luxembourg and became secretary-general of the ECSC. When Monnet retired from the presidency of the ECSC, Kohnstamm helped him set up the Comité d'Action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe and became its first secretary-general and eventually its vice-president. He was the first president of the European Institute in Florence from 1974 to 1981.
- 114 Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
- 115 Rabier and Kohnstamm, 1999, interviews.
- 116 Kohnstamm, 1999, interview.
- 117 The citations of Kohnstamm in the text and this note are excerpts of the 1999 interview with the author.
- One day Franz Etzel, the ECSC German vice-president, sent to Kohnstamm a former German officer for a job interview. "When the man entered he insisted to tell me all about his career in the *Wehrmacht*. I replied that this was none of my business. We were here for the future's sake, not to remain bound to the past. But my German visitor insisted to tell me how he had served under seven German generals in France, North Africa and Russia. He wanted me to know about his past so that things would be clear between us. I did not have anything to forgive him. We became great friends."
- 118 "I knew I had a real friendship with a German when we could talk about the concentration camps," says Rabier of his early years with the ECSC in Luxembourg. Rabier, 1999, interview.
- 119 Schuman, 1964, 49, 44, 26, 125.
- 120 Maurizio Cau, 2009, 433. Paolo Pombeni and Giuliana Nobili Schiera have edited the complete works of De Gasperi in three volumes, 2007, 2008, 2009.
- 121 See Capperucci; Cau; Lorenzini; Taverni in the excellent special issue of *Modern Italy*, 2009 on De Gasperi.
- 122 Monnet, 1978, dedication and 288.
- 123 Rabier, 1999, interview.
- 124 Fourastié, 1981, Marès interview.
- 125 Monnet, 1978, 341–2.
- 126 The French revolutionary politics of purity, with its "misplaced emphasis on the heart as the source of political virtue," ended up devouring its own children. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 86, 87.
- 127 Canovan, 1992, 197.
- 128 Bloomfield, 2006, 27–8. For an analysis that stresses the interaction between elite and grassroots processes of reconciliation, see Margaret Smith, 2005.
- 129 Maas, 2007; Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009.

The foundation of the ECSC was legitimate but it did not call upon civic participation of the many, although it did enjoy popular support. Hewstone, 1986.

130 According to Arendt, "opinion" cannot be represented and political parties promote "interests" rather than "public happiness." *On Revolution*, 267–8.

131 Arendt, *On Violence*, 84. For critical comments, see Canovan, 1978, 5–6; Kateb, 1984, 115.

132 Arendt, *On Revolution*, 267–8.

133 Isaacs, 1994, 159.

134 Rabier, 1999, interview.

135 Bouvet et al., 1998, 16.

136 Rocard and Herman, 1999, interviews.

137 Luttwak in Johnston and Sampson, 1994, 49–51.

138 Ibid., 52, 55.

139 Giroud in Giroud and Grass, 1988, 156.

140 Lean, 1988, 352–3.

141 Hovelsen, 1960, 58.

142 Laure in Piguet, 1985, 43–4, 47.

143 Marcel, 1971, 13, 21.

144 Montville, 1991, 183.

A DVD of Laure's story, "For the Love of Tomorrow," has been used in many situations of conflict around the world.

145 Barón Crespo, 1999, interview.

146 Cohn-Bendit, 1999, interview. Daniel Cohn-Bendit's parents were German Jews who fled to France in 1933 like Arendt. Their son has dual French and German citizenship, and was a German MEP in 1994–9; he was re-elected in June 1999 as a French MEP.

147 Rack, 1999, interview.

148 Virgin, 1999, interview.

149 Berger and Herman, 1999, interviews.

150 Bourlanges, 1999, interview.

151 Pond, 2002, 10.

152 Ibid., 11.

153 Haig Simonian and Robert Anderson, "Schröder forced to cancel Czech trip," *Financial Times*, Friday 1 March 2002; Robert Anderson, "Czechs reject idea of compensation for 2.5m expelled Sudeten Germans," *Financial Times*, Wednesday 10 April 2002.

154 Lalumière, 2002, interview.

155 Berger, 1999, 2002, interviews.

156 See report by Ulf Bernitz, Jochen A. Frowein, Lord Kingsland/QC, "Common Conclusions," 2 October 2002.

157 Pack, 1999, interview.

158 See bibliography for the two *Communications* from the Commission on the EU relations with the Middle East and the peace process, September 1993, and Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 285.

159 Ibid.

160 Rabier, 1999, interview. The interview took place before the earthquakes in Greece and Turkey, which provoked a thaw in the relationship.

According to John Gillingham, "a tradition of economic cooperation took hold in the heavy industry of Western Europe during the 1930s." This form of "business diplomacy" and "industrial self-government" would create habits of cooperation, and a "framework around which, after a generation of conflict, failure, and little overall progress toward solving the Ruhr problem, a satisfactory Franco-German settlement would be built." Gillingham, 1991a, 28, 30, 44.

161 Delors, 1999, interview.

162 Ibid.

163 Delors, 2000a and b.

164 Ibid.

165 Delors, 2006, 19–20.

166 Geremek, 2008, interview.

167 Arendt contrasted favorably the free play of debates over opinions against the "coercive" assertion of truth in politics. *Between Past and Future*, 235–49.

3 Remembering the principle of reconciliation: "applications"

1 Hartmann in Petritsch and Dzihić, 2010, 302–3.

2 Petritsch and Dzihić, 2010, 22, 17.

3 The section on Kosovo and Serbia includes excerpts of an article published in *The Journal of Common Market Studies* (May 2011), and I thank the editors for being able to use it.

4 Arendt, *Essays in Understanding*, 308. Arendt argues provocatively that "forgiving has so little to do with understanding that it is neither its condition or its consequence." Ibid.

5 Ibid., 307–27.

6 Monnet, 1955, 69.

7 Maximos Aligisakis, "Comprendre les Balkans pour agir autrement," *Le Temps*, Tuesday 13 April 1999.

8 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 214, 216.

9 Moll, 2008, 48, 40.

10 This account draws from Blitz, 2006; Dérens, 2008; Iseni, 2008; Kurspahić, 2006; Pond, 2006; Samary, 2008.

11 Ramet, 2005.

12 Roux, 1999, 62–70, 106–9.

13 Pond, 2006, 114; Dérens, 2008, 238–44.

14 Ahtisaari, 2007.

15 Gallak, V. (2008) "EU Arrives in Kosovo, but Divisions Linger," *eYugoslavia*, Thursday 18 December. Available HTTP: <<http://www.eyugoslvia.com>> (accessed 25 June 2008).

16 Bancroft, I. (2008) "A New Frozen Conflict?" *Guardian*, Monday 9 June. Available HTTP: <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/09/Kosovo.eu>> (accessed 25 June 2008).

17 The figures come from the Commissioner for Human Right's Report to the Council of Europe, 2 July 2009 and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 2010 Report. Both the Commissioner and the UNHCR warn that these figures may not be entirely reliable.

18 UN High Commission for Refugees Report on South-Eastern Europe, 2008. Balfour, 2008.

19 Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 255–8. Eichmann's trial was important because for the first time Jews sat in judgment of the crimes committed against their people. On the other hand, the defendant had been brought to justice by an act of kidnapping in flagrant contradiction with international law. The mitigating circumstance is that there was no true alternative. Like Jaspers, Arendt would have preferred for Eichmann to be tried for crimes against humanity in an international court. Ibid., 258, 263–4, 274–5.

20 Pond, 2006, 117, 254–60.

21 Subotić, 2009, 5, 192. Although Subotić critiques the use of transitional justice by domestic actors in Serbia especially, she does not argue against transitional justice: the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia removed criminals from Western Balkans politics, documented their deed and defined them as wrong. Ibid., 191.

- 22 For more on this, see Defrance and Pfeil in Mink and Neumayer, 92–103.
- 23 Pond, 2006, 267; Pack, 2008, interview; and more information available online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.cdsee.org/jhp/contact.html>> (accessed 13 April 2009).
- 24 Smith, 2005, 197–204, 11.
- 25 Ingraio and Emmert, 2009.
- 26 I thank Margaret Smith for providing me with the 2010 Editors' "Project Statement for the Washington Leadership Group for the Scholars' Initiative."
- 27 Dan Bilefsky, "Ethnic Albanians Chart Kosovo Path," *International Herald Tribune*, Wednesday 5 March 2008.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 F. Bytyci, "Kosovo Trepça Lead, Zinc Mines Sale Still on Horizon," *Guardian*, Friday 6 June 2008. Available HTTP: <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/feedarticle/7564658>> (accessed 5 July 2008).
- The EU Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo announced in February 2010 that it had successfully completed two EU-funded projects of around €1.6 million to make the Stantërg/Stari Trg mine safer. The mine belongs to the Trepça/Trepča Mining Complex and its final status is pending. Available HTTP: <<http://www.delpem.ec.europa.eu/?cid=1,103,741>> (accessed 10 July 2010).
- 30 Moll, 2008, 36.
- One major difference between the ECSC and the Kosovo–Serbia cases is that France and the FRG had internationally respected governments in 1950, whereas a December 2010 Council of Europe inquiry report accused Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Taçi of being linked to a mafia-like network which killed Serb prisoners to harvest their kidneys after the Kosovo war. Taçi's party came first in the parliamentary elections held in Kosovo two days before the publication of the report. He was seen as becoming more moderate and, on being elected prime minister in 2008, he made an attempt to reach out to Kosovo's dwindling Serbian minority by switching to speaking Serbian as he called on the Serbs to consider Kosovo their home. Available HTTP: <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/14/Kosovo-prime-minister-like-mafia-boss>> and <[http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/3524092](http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3524092)> (accessed 15 January 2011).
- 31 I thank Bashkim Iseni for this important insight.
- 32 Iseni, 2008, interview.
- 33 See Chapter 2 for more on this.
- 34 Pond, 2006, 241–3.
- 35 Balfour, 2008, 46.
- 36 EP news service, May 28, 2008.
- 37 Pack, 2008, interview.
- 38 "Serb leader Tadić apologizes for 1991 massacre." Available HTTP: <[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11689153#story\\_continues\\_2](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11689153#story_continues_2)> (accessed 8 December 2010).
- 39 Dérens, 2008, 9.
- 40 On the lack of forgiveness in Kosovo and Serbia, see Nora V. Weller, "The Failure to Face the Past in Relation to Kosovo," in Petritsch and Džihic, 2010, 265–85. In the same volume Wolfgang Petritsch and Vedran Džihic make the point that coming to terms with the past requires an international and stabilizing factor, presently the EU, and "time, a stable state and, before all, political will." Ibid., 17.
- 41 Marcel, 1971, 141–56; Hovelsen, 1959, 37–9. For more on this, see Chapter 2.
- 42 Arendt, *On Revolution*, 267.
- 43 Pond, 2006, 237, 211, 281.
- 44 Kostovicova in Petritsch and Džihic, 2010, 291–2.
- 45 Anstis, S. (2008) "The Fight for Ethnic Reconciliation and Peace in Kosovo." Available HTTP: <<http://www.towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1348/1/>> (accessed 25 October 2008)

- 46 Moll, 2008, 35.
- 47 Lebow, Kansteiner and Fogu, 2006, 286–90.
- 48 Kattan, 2002, 1–16.
- 49 See Chapter 1 for more on this.
- 50 Pellauer, 2007, 91.
- Ricoeur discusses the capable human being in *Oneself as Another* (1992). According to Richard Kearney, he views capability as a "potentiality." Even if mental illness or imprisonment prevents a person from acting, this person is still worthy of respect because she retains this capacity as a possibility. Kearney, 2004, 168.
- 51 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 89.
- 52 Fogu and Kansteiner, 2006, 289.
- 53 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 78, 91.
- 54 Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 152.
- Great funerals, which gather an entire people, illustrate collective mourning behaviors that start from the expression of affliction and end with the complete reconciliation with the lost object. Ricoeur, *Memory*, 78.
- 55 For more on this, see Auer, 2010; Elbe, 2003; and Mink, 2007.
- "Europe needs to engage its citizens by making its polity more political; that is, by opening it to fierce political contestation about its aims, and the ways in which best to achieve them." Auer, 2010, 1184.
- 56 Geremek, 2008, interview; and Geremek in Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009, 41, 38.
- According to Tony Judt, by 1989 the Communists had provoked "enough suffering and injustice of their own to forge a whole new layer of resentments and memories . . . Europe might be united, but European memory remained deeply asymmetrical." The "taboo" that prevented the comparison of Stalinism with Nazism was lifted after 1989. Some Western European intellectuals resisted this because "Communism was a failed variant of a common progressive heritage." Judt, 2005, 823, 826. Characteristically, Arendt resisted the taboo and compared Nazism with Communism in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, which made her internationally known in the late 1940s.
- 57 For instance, WWI carries traumatic memories for the British, French or Germans, whereas for most Central Europeans, that war is primarily associated with the birth (or rebirth) of national sovereign states. Geremek in Wiersma and Swoboda, 2009, 36, and Geremek, 2008, interview. Meanwhile, Western Europeans celebrate European integration, but the fights for freedom in 1956 in Hungary, in 1968 in Prague, and in Poland between 1980 and 1989 have been forgotten. Geremek, *ibid.*; and Auer, 2010.
- 58 Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009.
- 59 Wiersma and Swoboda in *ibid.*, 12, 21, 27.
- 60 Wiersma, 2008, interview.
- 61 Milan Zemko, Lázló Szarka and Stefan Šutaj in Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009, 171–91.
- 62 There is an important Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which has been struggling for the recognition of its rights. A law on language entering into effect on 1 September 2009 will bar Hungarian-speaking Slovaks from using their language in public in districts with less than 20 per cent ethnically Hungarian inhabitants. Karl-Peter Schwarz, "5000 Euro Strafe für Ungarisch," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Friday 24 July 2009.
- 63 Swoboda and Wiersma, 2009, 168.
- 64 Swoboda and Camens in *ibid.*, 250.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 249–50. Pinior is a former Solidarnosc student activist.
- 66 Martínez Martínez in *ibid.*, 207–13.
- 67 Laurinavičius in *ibid.*, 126–7.
- 68 Fontaine, 2008, interview. Fontaine's book was published simultaneously in French, English and German in 2009.
- 69 Fontaine, 2009, 317–55.
- 70 Perrin, 2008, interview.



- 71 Perrin has collected other "memories," which are hidden away for now in a basement room of the EP building and not yet filed: the roses President Mitterrand received on a visit to the Parliament, the agendas of Group meetings, gifts from visitors, lists of former MEPs, and much more, because "one day the boxes will open." Ibid.
- 72 Ricoeur, *Memory*, 284. The exhaustive index of Ricoeur's book does not include the word museum.
- 73 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 218.
- 74 Martínez Martínez and Spaak, 2008, interviews.
- 75 In February 2011 Martínez Martínez wrote that he "was now confident that the Museum would open under the foreseen schedule." He took it for granted that the 2.5 million in the 2011 budget would be secured, and was shortly addressing the EP's Budget Committee with his colleague Pöttering on the subsequent years of funding. A Museum Director and a staff have been hired, and an architectural proposal out of 12 finalists will soon be chosen. E-mail to the author, 23 February 2011.
- 76 According to Martínez Martínez, the Germans have made the most successful effort at remembering, as the "magnificent" Bonn Museum on German History demonstrates; the other two countries making the most dedicated effort to create a national memory are the Netherlands and Austria. Martínez Martínez, 2008, interview.
- 77 All the citations are from Martínez Martínez, 2008, interview.
- 78 Spanish national amnesia during the democratic transition was not the result of an agreement to "let us forget," according to Martínez Martínez. "It was about a relationship of force, which would permit nothing else. As the opposition, we succeeded in obtaining a constitution that allowed us to work with those who still controlled political power and military force. They accepted to play the democratic game . . . but not one judge was fired; the policemen who had tortured me were not fired. . . . Little by little the relationship changed, a new generation was born and those who had committed crimes died. Now there is a law on historical memory, more than anything else to avoid a falsification of memory by so-called historians, to make it legally impossible to declare that the Franco dictatorship was not fascist." Martínez Martínez, 2008, interview.
- 79 Report of the Committee of Experts on the House of European History, 2008, 5. I thank Mr. Martínez Martínez for providing me with a copy of the Report.
- 80 Ibid., 19, 21, 23.
- 81 Ibid., 12. Italics added by the author.
- 82 Proposals include some of the following questions: "Can Turkey become a full member of the EU? Why is the EU incapable of arousing any real enthusiasm among the general public in the Member States? How can the EU react to the demographic change affecting all its Member States?"
- 83 Spaak, 2008, interview.

One room in the exhibit featured the stories of 27 EU citizens (and couples) from the 27 Member States. Stories included: Inge and Klaus Stürmer who escaped from East Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1962; Fanourios Pantelogiannis who works with the Union of Cyprus municipalities attached to EU Committee of Regions and thinks that EU accession offers the only way out of the island's divisions; Rumen Borissov who founded an organic yogurt-making firm in 1997 with his wife and exports today well beyond Bulgarian borders; and Roger Lavis from the United Kingdom who managed the coordination of the French and British building sites during the construction of the tunnel under the Channel.
- 84 Antoinette Spaak opposed the inclusion of the word "Christianity" among the values mentioned in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, preferring the term "spiritual values."
- 85 With 350,000 visitors a year, many of them young people, the EP would offer an excellent site to give the young "a memory of Europe." Spaak, 2008, interview.
- 86 Ricoeur in Kearney, 2004, 152.

- 87 The names of the two teachers interviewed and whose classes were observed have been changed.
- 88 Moll, 2008, 40; Lévy, 2007, 262.
- 89 Arendt, *On Revolution*, 78–9.
- 90 Rosoux in Mink and Neumayer, 2007, 225–6.
- 91 Dewitte, 2008, 168–70.
- 92 Mill, 2008, 65.
- 93 Because of space limitations, this point is only mentioned here. For a brief but strong critique of "Western academic hegemony" in analyses of EU foreign policy, see Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008, 307–8.
- 94 Vembulu, 2003, 230, 5, 51–2. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's suggestion in 2009 that African countries could imitate the ECSC was not very well received. B. Hall and B. Jopson, "Sarkozy seeks peace role in Africa with shared mines plan," *Financial Times*, Thursday 26 March 2009.
- 95 Mustafa Kamal Kazi, 2002, interview.

#### 4 Of power and purgatory: building the European Communities

- 1 Kagan, 2004. Kagan celebrates certain European accomplishments and compares the European reconciliations to "the unfolding of a geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of world-historical importance." Kagan, 2004, 55–9 and 97.
- 2 I am indebted to Andrew Kalyvas for the distinction between political outcomes and Arendt's principles of action as an "enabling condition." Kalyvas, 2008, 253, n. 94.
- 3 François Duchêne in Kohnstamm and Hager, 1973, 6.
- 4 Lukes, 1991, 9–23.
- 5 Lang and Williams, 2005, 2. For recent studies on Arendt and international relations, see Hayden, 2009; and Owens, 2007.
- 6 Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 1–32. For more on productive power, see also Muppidi in *ibid.*, and Adler in *ibid.*
- 7 Arendt, *On Violence*, 35, 44.

Arendt wrote *On Violence* in part as a response to Fanon and Sartre's advocacy of violence during decolonization. Here she has more to say about power than violence, which she discusses relatively briefly. For a good critique, see Frazer and Hutchings, 2008, 90–108. See also Owens, 2007, especially Chapters 1 and 2.
- 8 *On Violence*, 14–16, and *The Human Condition*, 200.
- 9 *On Violence*, 51–2. For a good commentary on Arendt's discussion of the justifiable uses of violence, see Owens, 2007, 22–3.
- 10 *On Violence*, 5–6.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 5–6. For a commentary on Arendt's model of federalism and sovereignty in international relations, see Klusmeyer in Lang and Williams, 2005, 141–8.
- 12 Monnet, 1978, 323.
- 13 Kohnstamm in Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, 363. Maria Grazia Melchionni, an Italian academic, and Roberto Ducci, a senior Italian diplomat, interviewed 17 of the negotiators of the Rome Treaties in 1984, and their book is a highly readable collection of "witnesses." Most exhibit a remarkable capacity for self-reflection and irony about their own foibles; all are informative about the major points of contention, but also about less known yet important details of the negotiations.
- 14 Read Arendt on the council system in *On Revolution*, 247–73; *On Violence*, 14–19; *Between Past and Future*, 3–9.
- 15 For commentaries on the council system see, *inter alia*, Sitton in Hinchman and Hinchman, 1984, 307–29; Kalyvas 2008, 254–91.

Dietz reminds us that we should not be taken in by the apparent spontaneity of civic movements. The Czechoslovak Manifesto, Charter 77, which came as a surprise